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 ABSTRACT 
Housing is the most important component of wealth for many New Zealanders. 
Its location is fixed and its value is influenced by economic and other factors specific to 
that location.  Hence when people live in owner-occupied homes their wealth is strongly 
associated with their local economic conditions.  Housing is also a major factor in 
influencing migration decisions and, hence, regional mobility.  To shed light on the 
behaviour of the New Zealand housing market, we examine the dynamic and long run 
responses of house values across spatial communities and across time to economic 
variables that impact on the local economy. We use a specially constructed QVNZ-
sourced database for house prices and house sales, and a range of explanatory variables 









Housing is the most important wealth component for many New Zealanders.   
Housing trends affect people's welfare in direct and indirect ways and housing construction is 
an important component of economic activity.  It is imperative to understand the long-run 
determinants and the dynamics of the housing market for a number of economic and social 
policy-related reasons.  At least five reasons stand out. 
First, the location of housing is fixed and its value is influenced by both aggregate 
economic factors (e.g. interest rates) and by economic and other factors specific to that 
location (e.g. localised industry shocks and localised demographic trends).  As a result of 
these localised influences, when people live in owner-occupied homes, their wealth is 
associated with their local economic conditions.  Understanding the determinants of house 
values therefore assists in understanding a major determinant of individuals' and families' 
wealth dynamics over time. 
Second, other aspects of people's well-being - their incomes and the state of their 
local community (including locally-funded services) - are linked to the same local economic 
conditions.  People may wish to migrate from economically-depressed to expanding regions. 
However, a number of studies have found that people's ability and willingness to move from 
one region to another is dependent, in part, on the wealth they can derive from their existing 
housing asset, relative to that required to purchase housing in another region.
2  Understanding 
the economics of the housing market therefore assists in understanding an important aspect of 
regional mobility. 
Third, rental rates are positively related to house values (Savage, Kerr and Toplis, 
1989). Where an area faces a positive economic shock with resulting house price increases, 
rentals are likely to rise.  Individuals and households who rent rather than own their dwelling 
face a decrease in their well-being and may have to seek accommodation elsewhere, possibly 
in the same labour market (but in an alternative, and probably less desirable, location) or 
possibly in another labour market.  The latter entails working individuals having to seek 
alternative employment. 
                                                           
2 See, for instance, the analysis by Glaeser & Gyourko (2001) of the asymmetric reaction of house prices and 
population (through internal migration) to positive and negative changes in local economic conditions in the 
rustbelt of the United States. See also the analysis of Bate et al (2000) of the link between internal migration and 
housing in the United Kingdom.  
1  
Fourth, the ability of the building industry to service localised needs is of 
importance.  If bottlenecks appear in the supply of new houses in the face of strong localised 
demand, the effect can be a localised overshooting of house prices above fundamentals (i.e. 
above long run equilibrium) that can exacerbate the magnitude of some of the effects already 
discussed (Capozza, Hendershott, Mack and Mayer [CHMM], 2002). 
Fifth, the dynamics of the housing market impact strongly at the macroeconomic 
level, affecting aggregate expenditure patterns and fiscal revenues.  Changes in housing 
wealth impact on consumption expenditures that influence aggregate demand and output 
directly and consumer price inflation indirectly.  These effects flow through to monetary 
policy responses, with a feedback to housing and other markets through consequential interest 
rate changes. 
For all these reasons, a research programme that analyses the determinants both of 
the long run trends and of the dynamics of house price movements will be useful in informing 
policy as well as increasing our general understanding of the housing market. This study is an 
initial contribution to that programme. 
2  BACKGROUND AND PAPER OUTLINE 
Internationally, considerable work has been conducted on the determinants of house 
prices at aggregate and regional levels.  We do not provide a detailed description of this 
literature here.  Instead, we summarise the literature's findings with regard to key house price 
determinants arising from supply and demand forces as follows: 
2.1  Individual house characteristics: 
-  Number of bathrooms (Can, 1992); 
-  Lot size (Can, 1992); 
-  Presence of fireplace (Can, 1992; Dubin, 1992); 
-  Garage size (Can, 1992; Dubin, 1992); 
-  Presence of air-conditioning (Can, 1992; Dubin, 1992); 
-  Presence of a basement (Can, 1992); 
-  Detached dwelling (Dubin, 1992); 
-  Presence of a patio (Dubin, 1992); 
2  
-  Previous purchase price ( Genesove & Mayer, 2001). 
2.2  Neighbourhood and amenity characteristics: 
-  Neighbourhood quality index, e.g. deprivation index (Can, 1992); 
-  Local construction costs (CHMM, 2002); 
-  Land supply index, i.e. vacant land (CHMM, 2002); 
-  Coastal versus inland situation (cited by CHMM, 2002); 
-  Location/distance from city centre (Case & Mayer, 1996; Dubin, 1992); 
-  School assessment score (Case & Mayer, 1996);3 
-  Crime rate (Case & Mayer, 1996); 
-  House permits issued (Case & Mayer, 1996); 
-  Average/median per capita income (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997; CHMM, 2002); 
-  Real income growth (CHMM, 2002); 
-  Unemployment rate (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997). 
2.3 Demographic  variables: 
-  Population (CHMM, 2002); 
-  Percentage change in population (CHMM, 2002); 
-  Adult population, >21 years (Mankiw & Weil, 1989); 
-  Population aged <15 years (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  % of residents aged 35-60 years (Case & Mayer, 1996); 
-  % residents in manufacturing (Case & Mayer, 1996). 
2.4 Macroeconomic  variables: 
-  User cost of capital, and hence nominal interest rates, inflation rate, tax rates 
(CHMM, 2002; O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  Leverage, i.e. debt/equity (Genesove & Mayer, 2001); 
-  Price of investment in new dwellings (GSDD4, 1983); 
                                                           
3 Note the effect of this variable on house prices could be negative in a dynamic sense if the percentage of school 
age children in the population is declining. 
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-  Real disposable income (GSDD, 1983); 
-  Stock of existing dwellings (GSDD, 1983; O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  Growth in M3, pre financial deregulation (GSDD, 1983); 
-  Aggregate consumption (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  Occupied dwellings per person (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  Commodity prices (O'Donovan & Rae, 1997); 
-  Labour market conditions (O'Connor & Healy, 2002). 
There has been a body of international work that has examined the dynamics of 
house prices across regions and across time.  A recent study that does so, combining 
determinants of dynamics with long-run house price determinants, is the study of CHMM 
(2002).  That study, which forms a methodological basis for our current and future analytical 
work, isolates key factors (some amenable to policy action) that may cause lagged adjustment 
to fundamental values in house prices.  Factors are isolated that may cause house prices to 
overshoot their long-run fundamentals.  Each of these types of dynamic adjustment is likely to 
lead to economic inefficiencies (i.e. to resources being directed to ends which are not of the 
highest potential value).  An important finding of CHMM's work is that the cost of building 
new houses, including the regulatory costs and delays faced by developers in responding to an 
upsurge in housing demand, can be instrumental in causing the overshooting phenomenon.
5  
Downward shocks to regional fortunes can have an even greater (downward) effect on house 
prices, since falling demand for housing in the locality is not matched by any fall in supply, 
even over moderately long time horizons (Glaeser & Gyourko, 2001). 
New Zealand work analysing the determinants of house prices is limited.  At the 
aggregate level, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's modelling programme has led to 
econometric modelling of the nation-wide "price of existing dwellings".  GSDD (1983) found 
that in the long run, the price of existing dwellings was determined by the price of investment 
in dwellings (i.e. a Tobin's 'q' relationship, with a unit elasticity) modified by the impact of 
real disposable income (a significant positive effect) and the stock of dwellings (a significant 
negative effect).  The Tobin's q relation and the effect of the stock of existing dwellings is 
consistent with theoretical priors; the disposable income effect may reflect the presence of 
 
4 Grimes, Spencer, Duggan & Dick. 
5 Glaeser & Gyourko (2002) demonstrate that such restrictions can also lead to house prices in certain localities 
being permanently above the cost of constructing new dwellings. 
4  
liquidity constraints, especially given that the relation was estimated prior to financial 
liberalisation. 
The latter aspect is supported by the dynamics that included a strong effect of the 
change in real M3 money balances (essentially bank deposits) on the rate of change in 
existing dwelling prices.  The dynamics are particularly interesting.  The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable has a coefficient of 1.843, indicating that any transitory shock 
impacting on house prices in one period (e.g. because of a rise in real bank deposits and hence 
in funds available for house lending) had an even greater effect in the following quarter.  The 
sum of coefficients on the three lagged dependent variables, however, was less than unity 
indicating a stable, albeit overshooting, adjustment process. 
O'Donovan and Rae (OD&R, 1997) conduct the only comprehensive disaggregated 
econometric analysis of New Zealand house prices.  They model aggregate house prices in 
New Zealand and also model house prices at a 14-region level.
6
Their aggregate long-run house price model is based on the utility-maximising 
theoretical model that Pain & Westaway (1996) used to model the UK housing market.  This 
model yields a long run aggregate house price equation to be estimated of form: 
 g  ≡ p
h/p
c = θ(ch/c)-γ/[(r - ġ + δ)/(1+r)] (2.1) 
where: g is the real house price (p
h/p
c), c is aggregate real non-housing 
consumption, c
h is aggregate consumption of real housing services which is assumed to be a 
constant proportion (θ) of the real housing stock (h) at each point of time, p
h is an index of 
nominal house prices, p
c is an index of nominal consumer prices, r is the after-tax real interest 
rate, a dot signifies rate of change, and δ is the depreciation rate.  The expression in square 
brackets is the user cost variable (UC). 
OD&R estimate a slightly modified version of the theoretical equation as follows: 
  log (g) = f[log(c
h/c), UC, Z]  (2.2) 
where Z is a vector of additional factors. 
Because of their sample period (which extends from 1976 to 1995), OD&R face the 
problem that the user cost variable is frequently negative, especially prior to financial 
liberalisation in 1985.  Further, credit was rationed prior to this time.  For these reasons, they 
model a proxy for the after-tax real interest rate (R) as: 
                                                           
6 The 14 regions correspond to the 16 Regional Councils, with the Nelson, Marlborough and Tasman regions 
amalgamated into one region. 
5  
  R = (1 - D)(1-t)(i-π) + r0D (2.3) 
where D is a dummy variable = 1 prior to 1985:1 and 0 otherwise, i is the 90-day 
bank bill rate, and r0 is estimated freely (coming out at a sensible 3¼%).  Expectations of 
consumer price inflation are assumed to equal last year's inflation rate (π).  The authors proxy 
ġ, the expected rate of change of the relative price of houses to consumer prices, by the 
average rate of change of g over the past five years (this works considerably better than the 
change in g over the past year). 
Two other factors (in Z) which are added are: AGE, which is the log of the 
proportion of the population <15 (although ideally they would like the proportion of 
population aged 20-35, representing the pool of likely first home buyers
7); and ROOM, which 
equals the log of the number of occupied dwellings per person which takes account of the 
decline in average number of people per dwelling from 3.4 in 1975 to 2.9 in 1996.
8  
Their estimation uses semi-annual, seasonally adjusted house prices proxied by 
Quotable Value New Zealand's house price series, which measures average prices of freehold 
house sales adjusted for the quality-mix of sales in each survey period.
9 θ is taken to equal 
0.024 to ensure that the nominal value of imputed plus actual rent equals the official estimate 
in the base year of 1991/92. 
In their equation explaining the long run (equilibrium) determinants of real house 
prices, each variable is statistically significant with negative coefficients on each of (c
h/c) and 
UC, and positive coefficients on each of AGE and ROOM.  These signs are as expected. 
The OD&R short-run adjustment equation (i.e. explaining adjustment of house 
prices to their equilibrium) is driven primarily by the deviation between actual and 
equilibrium house prices last period.  The equation (which explains 75% of the variance of 
house price changes) has a number of novel features. First it has a form that specifies that 
house prices rise in response to disequilibria (i.e. where house prices are below equilibrium) 
but do not fall in response to disequilibria (where they are above equilibrium).  Periods of 
                                                           
7 See Mankiw and Weil (1989) on the importance, in the United States, of including the population aged 20-30 
years (key household formation years) as a determinant of house prices. They find also that use of the population 
aged over 20 years performs almost as well as the population aged 20-30 years; however, inclusion of total 
population performs poorly in their regression estimates. 
8 ROOM is calculated from census data & official annual estimates; i is the 90 day bank bill interest rate; π uses 
CPIIGST being the CPI excluding interest and GST; average income tax rate is total wage and salary tax receipts 
as a proportion of household disposable income (although presumably this should be as a proportion of gross 
income). 
9 Unit root tests show all variables to be non-stationary, i.e. I(1). Further, the long run equation has an R
2 of 
0.938 and passes a test for co-integration indicating a statistically appropriate long run relationship. 
6  
above-equilibrium house prices are generally equilibrated through a longer-term process of 
waiting for trends in other variables (e.g. consumer prices) to evolve so as to remove the 
disequilibria.
10  Second, the coefficients on lagged house prices in the equation indicate the 
presence of short-run overshooting of house prices (consistent with the previous New Zealand 
work cited).
11
At the regional level, OD&R find that semi-annual house price changes tend to be 
highly correlated across most regions (mostly 0.5<r<0.8, where r is the correlation 
coefficient).  The exception is the West Coast which has very low correlations with other 
regions (r<0.35 for all except for one case).  However, in a statistical test of whether the 
equilibrium house prices evolve similarly over time, they find only two cases (out of a 
possible 91 combinations) where regions move in tandem with each other.
12  Thus regional 
house-price cycles move together, but long-run trends do not.  The latter result does not deny 
the presence of some variables affecting long-run house prices similarly across regions; it 
does, however, indicate the existence of additional region-specific factors that cause 
divergences in long run house prices across regions over time. 
OD&R are unable to estimate a model of similar form to the aggregate model for 
each region owing to a dearth of quality regional data.  Instead they model each region's 
house price relative to the national average.  Factors assumed to influence this relativity 
include relative "gross regional product" (GRP) per person and relative unemployment rates.  
The latter variable may have both a direct effect on house prices through potential migration, 
etc and also an indirect effect by influencing liquidity constraints.  OD&R also include the 
effect of agricultural prices
13 relative to consumer prices; and relative populations. 
For the 14 regions' long-run house price equations, OD&R find that relative GRP 
per capita has a significant positive effect on relative house prices in eight regions; relative 
unemployment rates have a significant negative effect in nine regions; relative population has 
a significant positive effect in 6 regions; and commodity prices have a significant effect in 11 
regions with positive effects in nine of those regions and negative effects in Auckland and 
                                                           
10 This result is consistent with pro-cyclical movements in the number of house sales and with the negative 
correlation between days on the market and house price inflation. 
11 A third novel feature is that the short run equation is estimated econometrically by the Least Absolute 
Deviations (LAD) method because standard OLS places undue weight on extreme observations when the data 
generation process is non-normal. A graph in the paper shows major spikes in annual house price inflation 
potentially indicating non-normality.  Another graph in the paper shows the spectrum of real house price growth 
with a major cycle of 8 years and a minor cycle of 2 years. 
12 Based on a co-integration test regressing one region's house prices on those of another region. 
13 The agricultural price series uses commodity weights of meat (40%), dairy (35%), wool (25%). 
7  
Wellington (as expected given that the equation is explaining house prices relative to the 
national average). 
Interestingly, OD&R find that the estimates for the Bay of Plenty are often counter-
intuitive, and speculate that this may be because that region has different influences on it from 
elsewhere, perhaps because it is the "retirement Mecca" of New Zealand. 
This work at both the aggregate and the regional levels, taken in conjunction with 
recent international work at the regional level, informs our own approach as detailed below.  
Our work extends that of OD&R by examining house price developments both at Regional 
Council (RC) and Territorial Local Authority (TLA) levels.  At each of these levels we 
analyse the properties of house prices over time, including short-run and long-run 
relationships between house price movements across different areas. 
In dealing with Regional Councils, we amalgamate Nelson, Marlborough and 
Tasman councils (each of which corresponds to a single Territorial Local Authority (TLA)), 
so being consistent with one of our main sources of regional economic data: the National 
Bank of New Zealand's Regional Economic Activity Indices.  This allows us to examine the 
long run economic determinants of house prices over time; we present preliminary estimates 
on these determinants in this paper.  Future work will refine these estimates and analyse short-
run house price determinants in more detail. 
Our smallest unit of analysis for this study is the TLA of which there are 74 in New 
Zealand.
14  Henceforth, we drop the Chatham Islands from the analysis (due to its small size) 
and refer to New Zealand's 73 TLAs.  Examples of TLAs are: Whangerei District (population 
70,600), Manukau City (population 307,100), Rangatikei District (population 15,300), 
Hurunui District (population 10,300) and Dunedin City (population 120,300).  From these 
examples, the populations of TLAs differ considerably from one another, as do their areas. 
Data at the TLA level are being compiled which will enable us to test the 
hypothesis that economic and demographic shocks impacting at the geographical level 
influence house prices within that TLA.  In rural districts, for instance, we expect that relevant 
commodity prices will have an impact on incomes and the desirability of housing in that area.  
In TLAs within Auckland, international inward migration may have a significant impact on 
house prices.  In tourist areas, short-term international arrivals may have an impact.  In some 
cases we will have information on shocks measured at the TLA level (e.g. the value of 
                                                           
14 Data for house prices and sales are also available - but have yet to be utilised - at smaller levels of analysis; i.e. 
at area unit and mesh-block level. 
8  
agricultural and other land in that TLA); in others, our explanatory variables will be at a 
higher level of aggregation (e.g. nominal interest rates, which are set nationally).  Explanatory 
variables may include variables that are determined outside the country (e.g. commodity 
prices) or within the country but outside the region (e.g. government policy-induced shocks).  
In each case, the shocks will be taken to be exogenous to the individual TLA.
15  Testing the 
impact of these variables on TLA-level house prices is left to future work. 
In the next section we describe the theoretical approaches underpinning our 
subsequent empirical work. These approaches are based principally on Pain and Westaway 
(1996) and CHMM (2002). 
Section 4 describes our data on house prices and house sales in some detail.  This is 
the first paper to use a new dataset on these variables, obtained from QVNZ.  We document 
aspects of the data that are relevant both for the current analysis and for future users of the 
data. 
In section 5, we test for long-run and dynamic co-movement of house prices across 
regions.  In testing for dynamic co-movement across regions, we examine both 
contemporaneous and lagged effects, the latter indicating causality in a temporal sense.  This 
testing indicates whether house prices across New Zealand (or across parts of New Zealand) 
move together both cyclically and in the long term. 
Section 6 presents initial estimates of the long-run (equilibrium) determinants of 
real house prices at RC level.  Key conclusions regarding factors analysed in sections 5 and 6 
are signposted in section 7, which also summarises our intentions with regard to future work 
in this research programme. 
3 THEORY 
Our theoretical approach to estimating house prices builds on the work of Pain and 
Westaway (PW, 1996) and CHMM (2002).  PW formulate the consumer problem as one 
where each household allocates its lifetime wealth over housing services and non-housing 
consumption in each period of life and over its bequest.  Using standard forms of the utility 
function and aggregating over individuals, this results in an equation explaining real house 




h/c), UC]  (3.1) 
                                                           
15 I.e. not within the control of agents within that TLA. 
9  
where c
h = θh 
In this specification, p
h is the quality-adjusted price of housing. In practice, house 
prices are observed for bundles of housing and related services.  These services include 
house-specific services.  The services also include the amenity and location value of living in 
a particular locality.  In section 2, we summarised relevant components of these 
characteristics that have been found significant in hedonic regressions under the headings 
"Individual house characteristics" and "Neighbourhood and amenity characteristics". 
Our house sales price data is not quality-adjusted.  We can include the unadjusted 
real sales price (here denoted p
u) as the dependent variable as follows.  Let the real unadjusted 
price be a function of the real quality-adjusted price plus a vector of house-specific attributes 
(ZHOUSE) and a vector of locality-specific attributes (ZLOCAL). Each element of ZHOUSE 
and ZLOCAL is measured in such a way (for the following exposition) that the anticipated 
effect of that element on the unadjusted sale price is non-negative.  Thus (with anticipated 





c), ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL]  (3.2) 
              +                  +          + 
Each of ZHOUSE and ZLOCAL may contain elements that are fixed over time but 
that vary cross-sectionally (e.g. latitude of the locality).  Other elements may vary over time 
(e.g. changing house quality or changing amenities within a locality.)  Both sets of 
information can be included in a panel regression of real sale prices, although the former can 
also be handled through the inclusion of TLA fixed effects if poor proxies are available or if 





h/c), UC, ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL]  (3.3) 
          -         -         +                + 
In PW's approach, the non-housing consumption term (c) reflects the influences of 
lifetime wealth of a household living in the relevant area.  We can disaggregate the c
h/c term 
(recalling that c
h = θh), including the real housing stock variable (h) separately from the 
factors influencing lifetime income, and hence c.  Denoting the vector of factors determining 
current and future real incomes in the relevant area as ZINCOME (with the elements of the 
vector specified so that the anticipated effect of that element on income is non-negative) we 
arrive at the following long-run equation determining real unadjusted house sale prices: 
 p
u/ p
c = f4[h, ZINCOME, UC, ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL]  (3.4) 
10  
                                        -          +             -           +                + 
The stock of housing (h) in each area is determined jointly with house prices in the 
(very) long run.  However the housing stock only changes slowly over time and hence is a 
predetermined variable over short to medium time horizons.  By contrast, the house price is an 
asset price and so is a "jump" variable, reflecting the influence of new information, for 
instance within ZINCOME.  Consistent with this observation, OD&R found that their single 
equation estimates of house prices based on (3.1) gave very similar results to the full system 
of results which included equations also for consumption and for housing investment.  On this 
basis, we restrict our attention to a single-equation approach rather than estimate a full 
systems approach. 
The adjustment path of house prices (including the degree of lagged adjustment and 
the degree of overshooting, if any) will, however, be influenced by sales and supply-related 
factors (i.e. factors that influence the time path, and turnover, of h).  Thus (local) costs of 
constructing new houses, the degree of vacant land available for housing within a TLA and 
regulatory efficiency (e.g. in processing building permits) may all help determine dynamic 
house price adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.  In future work, we will test for these 
effects in our adjustment equations using methods that allow for asymmetric adjustment 
depending on whether house prices are above or below equilibrium. 
Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) we will also test whether a vector of such 
variables (denoted ZCONSTRUCT) influences the long run sale price over the relevant time 
horizon.
16  If ZCONSTRUCT is measured so that elements have a positive effect on house 
construction costs, the estimation equation becomes: 
 p
u/ p
c = f5[h, ZINCOME, UC, ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL, ZCONSTRUCT]  (3.5) 
                             -         +           -           +               +                   + 
We henceforth denote the equilibrium (estimated) value of the log of the real long-
run house price in (3.5) as P*. Turning to the dynamics for P*, we will utilise the framework 
of CHMM, who term P* "the fundamental value" of housing in an area. 
                                                           
16 For instance, taking an extreme, if building permits were impossible to obtain in a certain desirable area, a 
premium pertaining to that area could exist permanently. Note that the construction component is only one 
element of the full sale price - the other component being the land price; thus a marginal increase in local 
construction costs may have no discernable effect on local sale prices (of the dwelling plus land) if an increase in 
the value of the dwelling (through a Tobin's Q relationship) is offset by a compensating decline in the land price 
attached to that dwelling, leaving the occupant's dwelling choice unaltered in the face of the variables in (3.4).  
This is a matter for empirical testing. 
11  
Actual logarithmic values of real (quality unadjusted) house prices, P, are 
hypothesised to adjust over time (indexed by t) to the fundamental value as in (3.6): 
  ∆Pt = α∆Pt-1 + β( P*t-1 - Pt-1 ) + γ∆P*t  (3.6) 
The specification of (3.6) is broad enough to allow for partial adjustment (through 
α), adjustment to disequilibria in the housing market (through β) and immediate adjustment to 
fundamentals (through γ).  The relative values of α, β and γ in each region determine the 
degree of lagged adjustment and/or overshooting behaviour relative to fundamentals in that 
region.  CHMM demonstrate that as the serial correlation coefficient, α, increases, the 
amplitude and persistence of house price cycles tends to increase.  As the reversion 
coefficient, β, increases, the frequency and amplitude of the cycle tends to increase. 
Following CHMM, we allow the serial correlation and reversion parameters in the 
dynamic equation for each region themselves to be functions of sales, construction and related 
variables specific to a region.  Indexing regions by k, we specify the dynamic equation for 
each region's house prices as: 
  ∆Pkt = (α + ∑iαi(Ykit - Y*i))∆Pk,t-1 + (β+ ∑iβi(Ykit - Y*i))( P*t-1 - Pt-1 ) + γ∆P*t  (3.7) 
In (3.7) the Yi are independent variables influencing adjustment of house prices 
[elements of Yi may also appear in the long run equation (3.5)]; and Y*i represents the mean 
value of Yi.  In this specification, for instance, a region, k, that has a value of Ykit greater than 
Y*i will have faster reversion of prices to fundamentals than the mean speed of reversion if βi 
is positive. 
In operationalising (3.7), there is an issue as to whether the mean value should be 
time invariant as postulated by CHMM in (3.7). For variables that are trending over time, this 
specification will imply a gradual raising or lowering of the partial adjustment and reversion 
parameters. In some cases this may be economically sensible.  For example, if sales within 
each region are increasing over time, this may lead to faster reversion towards fundamentals 
over time across all regions.  On the other hand, if the Yi reflects real construction costs, one 
would expect these to rise over time (as real incomes rise) without any necessary effect on 
new housing starts (especially if labour productivity is improving at a similar rate). 
We consider that the most robust way of specifying the Yi variables is to choose 
forms of the variables that do not trend significantly over the sample period, so that the 
sample mean is a reasonable baseline against which to measure deviation of actual 
movements from the norm.  Thus in our examples above, we may prefer to use sales divided 
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by number of houses in the region, or to use some measure of real unit labour costs in 
construction. 
In determining the Yi variables, we will follow CHMM in choosing variables that 
influence housing market activity both in terms of sales of existing dwellings and new 
construction.  We also include variables that may be linked to market "euphoria". Unlike 
CHMM, we have quarterly data for house sales in each region for the whole period of our 
estimation and so can test the dynamic influence of this variable.
17  We also have data for 
building consents (albeit not for the full period) that we can employ. Variables that appear in 
ZCONSTRUCT are theoretically relevant to the dynamics and will also be tested; the changes 
of variables which appear in ZINCOME will be tested in keeping with CHMM's hypothesis 
that changes in such variables may be linked to short term "euphoria". 
Before estimating (3.5) and the dynamic equations for house price adjustment to 
fundamentals (3.6 or 3.7) we undertake a detailed time series examination of the sale price 
variables (section 5).  One of the key components of this examination is to test whether house 
prices across regional councils and TLAs "move together" in a statistical sense over both the 
short run and over the long run.  If they do move together in the long run, the implication is 
that (3.5) can be estimated solely using RC or TLA fixed effects plus national time series 
variables.  If they do not move together over the long run, locally varying time series 
variables (which are not co-integrated with one another) must be included within (3.5) to 
explain house prices within each area.  We can then test which variables within h, ZINCOME, 
ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL, ZCONSTRUCT and UC are relevant in driving the different price 
outcomes across different areas.  OD&R's results indicated that house prices do not evolve 
similarly over time across different regions in New Zealand.  However, our work covers a 
quite different time period, adopts a different frequency (quarterly rather than half-yearly) and 
uses different data to their work.  It is therefore important to test these time series properties 
prior to embarking on our theoretically-based estimation. 
4  HOUSING MARKET DATA 
We use QVNZ data for median residential house sales prices at the Territorial 
Local Authority (TLA) level.  For some of our analysis, we aggregate these data to Regional 
Council (RC) level using the correspondence shown in Table 1. (Table 1 also defines the 
                                                           
17 CHMM used population as an imperfect proxy for sales. However house sales are much more likely to capture 
dynamic effects than is a slow-moving variable such as population. 
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abbreviations used for each RC and TLA.)  In this correspondence, each TLA is allocated 
once (and only once) to each RC.
18  Data are also available for mean residential house sales 
price data and for the number of sales each quarter in the relevant area. 
In smaller TLAs, as shown in Table 2 (3
rd column) the number of sales per quarter 
can be low (e.g. as low as 16 in some quarters), while in larger TLAs, sales are normally in 
the hundreds each quarter.  This means that the data (both median and mean) are "noisier" in 
small TLAs (i.e. contains greater variability in quarter to quarter movements) than in larger 
TLAs and RCs.  Neither the median nor the mean data is uniformly less noisy than the other; 
however, on balance, the median data displays a little less variability than does the mean data 
(i.e. it appears to be less susceptible to sales of one, or a few, very high price houses).  For this 
reason, we use the median data in what follows. 
All sales price and activity data are available quarterly for the 88 quarters from 
March quarter 1981 [1981(1)] to December quarter 2002 [2002(4)].
19  We have checked 
through all 7,656 sales price observations (88 quarters each for 73 TLAs plus 14 RCs).  In a 
few cases, there are major changes in prices that are reversed in the following quarter (or, 
occasionally, two quarters).  These observations are likely to be due to measurement error or 
to small sampling in those cases (i.e. to situations where only a small number of sales 
occurred in that quarter). 
In order to purge the data of extreme movements we have compiled a database that 
cleanses the data of major quarterly real sales price changes.
20  Where the real sales price 
increased by more than 33.3% or decreased by more 25%,
21 that observation has been 
inspected and where a reversion in value takes place subsequently, the "offending" quarter's 
sale price has been smoothed through use of a linear interpolation between the previous and 
                                                           
18 In fact, definitional boundaries for TLAs are driven mainly by history and by human geography, while RC 
boundaries are driven mainly by physical geography (water catchments), with the result that some TLAs span 
more than one RC. We have allocated TLAs to RCs based on the implicit allocation indicated in the Statistics 
New Zealand map, New Zealand Cities and Districts.   
19 In using this data, we had to construct the final five observations for the Selwyn TLA (with the last four 
observations missing from our QVNZ data-source and the previous observation clearly incorrect). To construct 
these 5 observations we ran a regression of Selwyn house sales prices on a constant plus the sales prices of the 5 
contiguous TLAs (Hurunui, Waimakariri, Christchurch City, Banks Peninsula and Ashburton) from 1981(1) - 
2001(3), and then used the sales price values in these 5 TLAs to construct values for Selwyn for the missing 
observations. This process is considered to give a consistent estimate of Selwyn prices over these 5 quarters, but 
imparts less quarterly variability to Selwyn observations over these five observations than occurs prior to 
2001(4). 
20 "Real sales price changes" refers to the area's median sales price/CPII, where CPII is the CPI excluding 
interest and credit charges (these charges are no longer included in the CPI, although they were in earlier years).  
All references to the CPI henceforth use this definition. 
21 I.e. where the ratio of the price in period t to period t-1 is greater than 4/3 or less than 3/4.  
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subsequent sales prices for that area.  As Table 2 shows, most such smoothing adjustments 
occurred for areas in which there were relatively few sales. In 42 of the 73 TLAs and in 13 
out of the 14 RCs, no smoothing adjustments were made. In a further 15 TLAs, only one or 
two observations were smoothed; 13 TLAs and one RC had three to eight observations 
smoothed (i.e. fewer than 10% of their observations) while 10, 12 and 13 observations were 
smoothed respectively in Otorohonga, MacKenzie and Grey.  Even after these smoothing 
adjustments, TLAs with relatively few sales still have considerably greater quarter-to-quarter 
variability in their real median sales prices, as shown in Table 2.
22
Quarterly variability in the data is potentially both helpful and harmful to aspects of 
our empirical work.  To the extent that quarterly variability reflects responses to economic 
developments, the variability will assist in discriminating between the causes of house price 
movements.  However to the extent that it arises from measurement issues, the variability may 
disguise some relationships.  This latter aspect is likely to be more problematic for 
interpreting the dynamics of house price movements (i.e. house price movements from quarter 
to quarter) rather for interpreting the long run determinants of house prices across different 
areas.  We have no reason to believe that house price levels or long-run trends are in any way 
distorted by the nature of the data that we have obtained. 
Table 2 (1
st column) presents the nominal median sales price for each TLA and RC 
for 2002 (calendar year average of 4 quarters).  Median prices vary from $49,000 in each of 
Kawerau and South Waikato to $342,000 in Auckland City.  At the RC level, prices vary from 
$63,000 on the West Coast to $282,000 in Auckland region.  Figure 1 illustrates the potential 
for widely divergent nominal price trends, graphing the nominal sales prices for Auckland 
City and Kawerau TLAs.  The ratio of the two series was 1.4 in 1981 and 7.0 in 2002. 
The second column of Table 2 presents the average percentage change in real sales 
price from 1981 to 2002 (calendar years).  At the RC level, variation in the real sales price 
over the 22 years varies from a minimum of -27% (Southland) to a maximum of 111% 
(Auckland), indicating major divergences in sales price growth over the period.  At the TLA 
level, the variation is even greater with minimum real growth of -50% (Kawerau) and a 
maximum of 152% (Auckland City).  At the TLA level, 15 areas had negative real sales price 
growth while six had growth in excess of 100% (i.e. the real price had at least doubled).  The 
15 negative cases are predominantly rural, while the cases with a doubling in real prices were 
                                                           
22 The cross-sectional TLA correlation coefficient between average sales and standard deviation of quarterly real 
sales price changes is -0.67; and that between number of quarters with sales <50 and the standard deviation of 
real price changes is 0.66. 
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in or around major cities plus two tourism-related areas: Thames-Coromandel and 
Queenstown. 
Figure 2 graphs real house prices
23 in the TLAs at the heart of New Zealand's five 
major urban areas.  The period for which the data are available is one of considerable 
variation in economic policy frameworks.  These frameworks ranged from the 
"interventionist" regime from 1981-1984 to the subsequent "market-based-regime" with a 
major transition period covering 1984-1991.  The early regime was characterised by high 
international trade restrictions (Lattimore, 2003), high degrees of regulation of economic 
activity, and tax and expenditure regimes that were designed to favour certain sectors over 
others.  The latter regime attempted to open up markets to international competition, to 
deregulate domestic markets and to implement a fiscal regime that was broadly neutral across 
sectors.  Macroeconomic policy also evolved from one of high fiscal deficits accompanied by 
high inflation (and loose monetary policy) to greater fiscal stringency and monetary policy 
targeting low inflation, again with a significant period of transition to these outcomes (Evans 
et al, 1996).  It is reasonable to expect that these major policy changes impacted on different 
parts of the country in different ways, potentially affecting regional house prices differently. 
Differential price movement across regions is illustrated in Figure 2.  At the start of 
this period, the three major North Island cities (Auckland, Wellington and Hamilton) had 
house prices that were closely grouped together, with the South Island cities (Christchurch 
and Dunedin) in a separate group below those of their northern counterparts.  Over the 
following ten years, Wellington and Auckland prices grew almost in lock-step with one 
another, while Hamilton and Christchurch converged to form a second group, and Dunedin 
lagged behind all four.  In the second half of the sample, Auckland moved further ahead of all 
other cities, with Hamilton once again opening up a small gap over Christchurch. 
Figures 3 - 5 graph real house prices at the RC level, demonstrating different 
patterns.  Figure 3 graphs the prices for two, mainly rural, North Island RCs: Northland and 
Manawatu-Wanganui.  While some similarity in patterns is evident at times, the overall 
picture is one of divergence, especially after 1993.  By contrast, in Figure 4, two neighbouring 
North Island RCs (Waikato and Bay of Plenty) exhibit apparent close co-movement over the 
entire sample.  Figure 5 demonstrates that close co-movement is not restricted to 
neighbouring regions: two largely agriculturally-based regions, Hawkes Bay and Canterbury 
(one North Island, one South Island) also tend to have prices moving together over time.  The 
                                                           
23 "House prices" henceforth refers to the median residential house sales price for the relevant area. 
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data also indicate that neighbouring TLAs within the same region sometimes move closely 
together, but at other times do not.  To illustrate, figure 6 indicates a high degree of co-
movement between Hamilton and its neighbouring rural/urban fringe TLA, Waikato.  By 
contrast, Waikato and South Waikato show little co-movement (figure 7). 
A major task of this research programme is to analyse what factors determine the 
degree of co-movement of prices across RCs and TLAs.  Section 6 begins this task; section 5 
applies statistical tests to examine whether regions move together over both the short term and 
the long term. 
Before embarking on this analysis, we observe from inspection of data patterns in 
Table 2 and as described above, that areas with strongly growing real prices over 1981 - 2002 
are mainly urban while areas with declining real prices are mainly rural.  Based on this 
observation, coupled with an observation that urban house prices normally exceed rural house 
prices, one hypothesis to test, using just the real house price data, is that areas with initially 
high prices (in 1981) had subsequent faster price growth than initially lower-priced areas.
24  If 
this hypothesis were upheld, it would imply a diverging level of real house prices over time 
across the country. 
We test this hypothesis over three time periods: 1981 - 2002 (whole sample), 1981 - 
1991/92 (first half of the sample
25), and 1991/92 - 2002 (second half of the sample).  The first 
half of the sample conveniently covers the period from prior to the economic reforms that 
began in 1984, to the final major policy changes of 1991 (the social welfare benefit cuts and 
the Employment Contracts Act).  In policy terms, the second half of the sample is a relatively 
settled period.  Thus our tests indicate whether the reforms themselves were associated 
contemporaneously with relatively high price areas becoming even higher priced (in relative 
terms); and/or whether post-reform economic developments had such effects. 
Table 3 details the results of regressions testing this hypothesis over each of the 
sample periods, at each of the TLA and the RC levels.  The dependent variable in the 
regression is the growth rate of the real house price and the independent variable is the start of 
period real price level.  For TLAs, there are 73 cross-sectional observations for each of the 
three regressions; for RCs there are 14 cross-sectional observations.  The table details the 
                                                           
24 Statistically, we test the null hypothesis that initial house price levels have no influence on subsequent house 
price growth. 
25 The 1991/92 year is the mean of the 4 quarters from September 1991 to June 1992, being the exact mid year of 
the sample. 
17  
coefficient on the price level term (the constant is not reported but is included in each 
equation), its t-statistic, significance level (p-value) and the R
2 of the equation. 
The results indicate that over the whole sample, those TLAs and RCs with high 
initial prices (in 1981) had a higher rate of price growth than those areas with lower prices.  
These results (at both the TLA and RC level) imply a divergence in relative house prices over 
time.  Breaking the sample in half yields an interesting finding.  Over the first half of the 
sample (at each of TLA and RC level) there is no significant relationship between price 
growth and initial price level.  By contrast, there is a strongly significant positive relationship 
over the second half of the sample.  For whatever reason (e.g. opportunities set in train by the 
newly reformed economy, or changing world patterns of production, or changing personal 
preferences, etc) it is in the post-reform period that the house price divergence is most 
marked. 
We can interpret the coefficients in the RC equation over the second half of the 
sample as follows:  House prices in a region with an initial house price of $100,000 in 
1991/92
26 are estimated to have grown through to 2002 at an annual rate 1.41% faster than 
house prices in an area with an initial house price of $90,000. 
We have tested whether this result is driven solely by an "Auckland effect" given 
that evidence already presented shows quite different house price behaviour in Auckland 
relative to the rest of New Zealand.  To do so, we re-ran the RC regression excluding 
Auckland from both sub-periods.  In the first sub-period, there is again no statistically 
significant association between initial house price and subsequent growth (the slope 
coefficient is -0.08 with a t-statistic of 0.26).  In the second sub-period, we again find a 
statistically significant association (at the 5% level) with a slope coefficient of 0.42 and a t-
statistic of 2.20. 
Interpreting the coefficients in the second sub-sample (excluding Auckland) house 
prices in a region with an initial house price of $100,000 in 1991/92 are estimated to have 
grown through to 2002 at an annual rate 1.33% faster than house prices in an area with an 
initial house price of $90,000.  This result indicates that the divergence finding in the second 
sub-sample is not specific to Auckland, although the effect is slightly stronger in magnitude 
when Auckland is included in the analysis. 
                                                           
26 Measured in June 1999 values. This value is close to the median RC price for 1991/92. 
18  
5  TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
In this section, we build on the data analysis above, focusing on the behaviour of 
real house prices.  We examine the long run and short run links between house prices across 
RCs and across TLAs, and examine the dynamic nature of house price
27 developments within 
each region. 
5.1  Long run analysis 
In analysing the long-run properties of the house price series, we examine two 
aspects of the data.  First, we analyse the time series properties of the individual house price 
series.  This can demonstrate whether prices are trending over time in a deterministic fashion 
and can indicate whether shocks to prices have transitory or permanent effects.  Second, we 
can test whether, in the long term, price series across different regions move together in 
response to shocks hitting each region. 
5.1.1  Univariate time series properties 
First, we examine the time series properties of the house price data.  We test 
whether the effects of shocks on house prices are transitory or permanent. If the former, the 
series are stationary (possibly around a deterministic trend), i.e. integrated of order zero [I(0)]; 
if the latter, the series are non-stationary (possibly with drift), i.e. integrated of order one 
[I(1)].
28  
If price series in different regions are stationary, they move together in the long run, 
with deterministic divergence if and only if they have different deterministic time trends.  If 
price series across different regions are non-stationary, they may or may not move together.  
In general, they will not do so.  However, if two series are co-integrated then some linear 
combination of the series is stationary.  In this special case, the price in one region moves in 
tandem with some proportion of the price in another region.  In some contexts, co-integration 
of two series is taken to imply that the two series move together.
29  However, that is not 
normally the case.  If the coefficient in the co-integrating vector relating the log of two series 
is not equal to unity then even though some combination of the two series is co-integrated, the 
levels of the two series will still drift apart over time in response to random permanent shocks.  
                                                           
27 Unless otherwise stated, henceforth "house prices" refers to real house prices. This concentration on real house 
prices enables us to abstract from changes in inflation trends over the sample. 
28 It is possible that the changes in the series themselves could be non-stationary, in which case the order of 
integration of the levels series would be greater than one. However, as expected with real price data, the 
statistical tests indicate that none of the series is integrated of order greater than one. 
29 For instance, OD&R test whether pairs of house price series are co-integrated, presumably with this in mind. 
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For two (log) price series to move together over the long term (i.e. for the ratio between them 
to converge to a constant in the long run), the coefficient in the co-integrating vector must 
equal one. 
Table 4 tests for the order of integration of the RC house price series.  The four 
columns test for stationarity for each series respectively in: levels with deterministic trend and 
constant, levels with constant only, 1st difference with constant, and 1st difference without 
constant.  The first figure in each cell is the p-value on the test to reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root.  A second figure is included in a cell only if the p-value of the first figure <0.100 
and the p-value on the Trend (1
st column) or Constant (3
rd column) <0.100 [this second p-
value is given as the second figure in these cases].  If the results in a cell are significant at the 
1%-10% level, this is indicated in shaded print
30.  Testing stops where all figures in a cell are 
significant at 1%. 
Overall the tests indicate that 1 series is I(0) with a deterministic trend [RC12]; 
another series [RC08] may be I(0) with no deterministic trend; 12 or 13 series are I(1), 5 of 
which may have drift (0.01<p<0.10 on the constant in these 5 cases); the remainder have no 
drift.  On the basis of these tests, we consider it prudent to treat all series in subsequent 
empirical work as I(1), potentially with drift (especially since the region with a clear I(0) 
result is West Coast (RC12) which has a high standard deviation of quarterly returns, so the 
test may exaggerate the stationarity of the actual series). 
Since we conclude that the RC price series are generally I(1), and these series are 
aggregations of TLA series, we adopt a maintained hypothesis in subsequent work that TLA 
price series will also be I(1). 
5.1.2  Long run co-movement 
Second, we test, at the RC level, whether the ratio of each combination of pairs of 
house price series is stationary.  If so, we can conclude that the pair of house price series is 
co-integrated with a coefficient of unity in the co-integrating vector.
31  In that case, we 
conclude that economic and other shocks impact similarly on the two regions' house prices in 
the long run and so the two house price series move together over time.  If we reject 
stationarity of the price ratio, the implication is that the two prices are influenced differently 
from one another by at least one non-stationary explanatory variable. 
                                                           
30 Red print in colour. 
31 Because we are imposing the unit coefficient, we use standard unit root test values rather than the modified 
test statistics appropriate for co-integration tests involving estimated coefficients. 
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Table 5 presents the p-value on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit 
root in the levels of Ln(Real Median Sales Price)i - Ln(Real Median Sales Price)j between all 
possible pairs (i, j) of RCs (i.e. a test of whether the two series are co-integrated with 
coefficient of 1).  The figures in the bottom left of the table present the tests without 
deterministic trend; the figures in the top right of the table allow for a deterministic trend to be 
present.  In this latter case, even if co-integrated, the two series will drift apart in a 
deterministic fashion if the trend is non-zero, but given this drift, shocks will impact similarly 
on each of the regions. 
A bold figure in the bottom left of the table denotes a p-value on the ADF < 0.100; 
italics in bottom left denotes 0.100 < p < 0.200. A bold figure in the top right of the table 
denotes a deterministic trend significant at 10% level where p < 0.100; italics in the top right 
denotes ADF and trend both have p < 0.200 and one of the coefficients has p > 0.100. 
Without allowing for a deterministic trend and using a 10% significance level for 
the test, only 19% of the 91 RC pairs are co-integrated
32.  Co-integration is much more 
common between RCs within the South Island, with 50% of South Island pairs co-integrated; 
only 8% of North Island pairs are co-integrated; 20% of North-South Island pairs are co-
integrated.  These results indicate that house prices across RCs exhibit different long run 
behaviours across New Zealand, although more long run co-movement is observed in the 
South Island which may be more homogeneous economically and demographically than is the 
North Island. 
If a deterministic trend is allowed for, and if we lessen the stringency of the test to a 
p-value of 20%, we find 52% of RC pairs are co-integrated.  Now 90% of South Island pairs 
are co-integrated, 44% of North Island pairs are co-integrated and 49% of North-South Island 
pairs are co-integrated.  Even with this less stringent test, approximately half of all pairs have 
house prices diverging over the long term. 
Table 5 also indicates, where the deterministic trend is significant, the value of that 
trend.  This value can be interpreted as the rate at which the house price of the first-named 
series rises relative to that of the second-named series in the absence of other shocks.  Each 
pair includes the lower-numbered RC (which is normally the more northern RC) first.  Of the 
30 significant time trends, 19 are positive indicating generally faster house price growth in 
northern relative to southern regions of the country.  It is possible that as incomes rise, prices 
                                                           
32 With coefficient of one; this qualification is taken as implicit henceforth. This is a considerably higher number 
of cases than OD&R found, but still consistent with their finding that the majority of pairs are not co-integrated. 
21  
in warmer and/or sunnier areas rise in relative terms implying that "warmth" may be a 
characteristic with income elasticity greater than one.
33  We can test whether there is a time 
varying coefficient on factors relating to climate and/or latitude within our vector of ZLOCAL 
variables in our subsequent work. 
Tables 6 - 18 present the same set of co-integration tests for TLAs within each RC 
(excluding RC05 / Gisborne where the RC is identical to the TLA).  The results in these tables 
indicate the extent to which TLAs within RCs move with one another in the long run.  Here 
we see considerably more long-term co-movement than at the nation-wide level.  
The median number of TLAs within RCs that are co-integrated at the 10% level 
without deterministic trend is 48%, while the median figure is 93% with deterministic trend at 
the 20% level (Table 19).  By comparison, recall that the corresponding figures for co-
movement between RCs were 19% and 52% respectively. 
These results imply greater commonality of the effects of shocks on house prices 
within RCs than across RCs.  The findings here are useful for informing our subsequent 
econometric work.  We should not expect regional house prices (either across RCs or TLAs) 
to be determined in a similar fashion solely by national variables or by regional variables that 
are co-integrated with one another.  Some degree of region-specific variation in the 
explanatory variables (or else region-specific responses to national variables) will be required. 
5.2   Dynamic analysis 
Three aspects of dynamic movements in house prices are of interest: dynamics in 
the univariate house price series; contemporaneous correlations between price changes across 
regions; and intertemporal correlations between regions which can be interpreted as "causal" 
movements (in a temporal sense) from one region to another.  Together these aspects provide 
information about the nature of house price adjustment and the spatial responsiveness of 
house prices to shocks. 
5.2.1 Univariate  dynamics 
First, we examine the univariate dynamics of real house prices to discover whether 
shocks in one quarter have an effect on subsequent quarters' price movements within the same 
region.  House prices are an asset price. Standard asset pricing results suggest that quarterly 
changes in asset prices should not be able to predict subsequent quarterly price changes 
("weak form efficiency").  If they could do so, an expected profitable strategy is available to 
                                                           
33 This phenomenon seems to be observed in some other developed, temperate countries (e.g. US and UK). 
22  
the investor to buy (or sell) an asset and then to sell (or buy) it subsequently.  Efficient 
markets should have prices adjust instantaneously so that such expected profit strategies 
disappear. 
However, housing is unlike a financial asset in that individual houses have some 
degree of uniqueness and each house is not freely traded in a liquid market.  This feature may 
allow for partial adjustment of house prices to fundamentals or possibly to overshooting of 
prices to fundamentals (as in CHMM, 2002, discussed above).  In the former case, a 
univariate regression of quarterly house price changes in a region on lags of itself should 
produce a positive coefficient; in the latter case, the coefficient will be negative. 
To test the dynamics of regional house prices, we regress the quarterly change in 
the log of each RC real house price on a constant and four lags of itself (Table 20).  The 
results indicate that one of the 14 regions (RC02) exhibits positive 1
st order autocorrelation of 
real price changes (i.e. partial adjustment), albeit only at the 8% significance level.  Nine of 
the 14 regions exhibit negative autocorrelation of price changes over one and/or two quarters 
at the 10% significance level (indicating overshooting); seven of these cases are significant at 
the 5% significance level.  Two regions exhibit positive annual autocorrelation (i.e. at the 4
th 
lag) at the 5% level indicating a seasonal effect.  (One RC exhibits negative annual 
autocorrelation at the 9% level, possibly indicating some degree of seasonal overshooting.)  In 
each of the three equations where the 4
th lag is significant, addition of further lags results in 
no further additional significant variables.  Thus we can be confident that for most RCs price 
changes follow a first, or occasionally a second order process, with little seasonality in the 
dynamics except possibly in two or three cases. 
Two regions, RC02 and RC03 (Auckland and Waikato) have significant positive 
constant terms.  This result is in keeping with Table 4, where these were the only two regions 
with significant constant terms at the 5% level in the unit root test on differences in the log of 
real house prices. 
The tendency towards an overshooting process in the majority of regions could 
possibly be explained by noisiness in the data caused by measurement (or other) errors in one 
period being unwound in the subsequent period.  The fact that the RC with most quarterly 
sales (RC02: Auckland) has a positive partial adjustment coefficient is consistent with this 
explanation.  However, as shown in Table 2, other regions also have large numbers of 
quarterly sales, particularly RC13 (Canterbury), RC09 (Wellington), RC03 (Waikato), RC08 
(Manawatu-Wanganui) and RC14 (Otago).  Four of these five regions exhibit significant 
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negative first or second order autocorrelation.  Further, the overshooting result is consistent 
with previous New Zealand research cited earlier (GSDD and OD&R) and with some cited 
international research (CHMM) making the "error" hypothesis less persuasive, at least as the 
sole cause of the negative auto-correlation. 
A related explanation is that the composition of housing may shift in response to 
shocks.  For example, following a negative shock, the "best" houses may be taken off the 
market and only lower-quality homes are sold.  In this case, the observed median (and mean) 
house sale price would dip sharply immediately following the shock.  In subsequent quarters, 
"better" houses may be placed back onto the market as owners come to assess the permanence 
of the shock.  In that case, house prices in subsequent quarters would rise relative to the first 
quarter's depressed price, albeit without re-establishing earlier levels.  This hypothesis can be 
tested indirectly in subsequent empirical work when we come to test the impact of sales levels 
on the dynamics of house price adjustments to fundamentals. 
5.2.2 Contemporaneous  correlations 
Shocks may impact similarly on regions to a greater or lesser extent in the short 
term than in the long term.  Regions that do not have house prices moving together in the long 
term (i.e. which are not co-integrated) may nevertheless show significant short-term co-
movement.  Conversely, regions that have co-integrated house prices, may display quite 
different short run dynamics. 
Table 21 presents contemporaneous correlation coefficients for quarterly changes in 
the log of real house prices across RCs.  Of the 91 correlations, 56 are significant at the 5% 
level and 70 are significant at 10% (i.e. 62% and 77% of correlations are significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels respectively).  Only two of the 91 correlations were negative and neither of 
these was significantly different from zero. 
We have also calculated the contemporaneous correlation coefficients for all pairs 
of 73 TLAs. At this level, of the 2,628 correlations, 461 are significant at the 5% level and 
691 are significant at 10% (i.e. 18% and 26% of correlations are significant at the 5% and 
10% levels respectively).  Table 22 examines the degree of correlation of TLA house price 
changes within RCs.  The results indicate that TLAs within RCs are no more correlated with 
each other in terms of short-term price movements than are TLAs nationally.  The major 
exception is Auckland where 17 of 21 potential correlations are significant at the 10% level.  
This lack of short-run co-movement by TLAs within RCs and relatively high degree of 
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correlation between RCs, contrasts with the long-run co-movement results where TLAs 
within RCs tend to exhibit greater co-movement than do the RCs between themselves. 
The RC results imply that short-term house price movements are influenced by 
similar factors across the country as a whole (i.e. across RCs), but with significant local 
variation.  National shocks therefore appear to impact across the country but, from our earlier 
long run results, are not sufficient to explain nation-wide disparities in house price outcomes.  
Accordingly, we might expect our subsequent empirical work to indicate widespread effects 
of a national variable (such as interest rates) on house prices across regions, with additional 
region-specific variables being important in determining long-run house price developments. 
5.2.3 Causality  tests 
As well as contemporaneous correlation, it is possible that price developments in 
one region impact subsequently on prices in other regions.  Intuitively, for instance, we may 
expect that price developments in an agriculturally-based TLA (potentially reflecting 
agricultural price movements relevant to that TLA) may subsequently impact on price 
developments in a neighbouring urban TLA.  Conversely, price developments in an urban 
TLA may subsequently impact on a neighbouring urban fringe TLA where new housing 
development may occur in response to neighbouring increased demand. 
To examine whether such impacts occur, we use Granger Causality Tests (GCTs) to 
estimate whether one region's price developments helps explain future price developments in 
another region over and above the explanation afforded by the second region's own history for 
its price outcomes.
34  In operationalising this approach, we must first decide on the number of 
lags to include in the test.  The results in Table 20 indicate that most regions can be 
characterised by at most a second-order autoregressive structure. Thus two lags should suffice 
in the test.  However, a further three regions had some significant 4
th order autocorrelation.  
We therefore test the robustness of our results by also using a four-lag structure. 
Table 23 presents the results for RCs using both lag structures.  In each case, 182 
GCTs are presented (i.e. causality tests in each direction for each of the 91 RC pairs). With 
two lags (four lags), 48 (45) significant results at the 10 per cent level are found; 134 (137) 
results are not significant.  Across the two lag structures, 118 insignificant results are 
consistent across the two options and 29 significant results are consistent; 19 (16) significant 
                                                           
34 When we talk about "causality" here we mean that price developments in one region statistically help to 
explain subsequent price developments in another region; we do not necessarily imply that the second region's 
price changes are attributable to the first region's price change (although this may be the case). 
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results in the two lag (four lag) case are insignificant with four (two) lags. While the results of 
Table 20 indicate a preference for the two-lag option, the four-lag option is less likely to give 
false indications of causality, albeit at the loss of power in the test (exhibited by the slightly 
fewer cases of causality indicated). 
With no clear preference between the two, we list in Table 24, the number of times 
(under each lag structure) each region "causes" others, and the number of times each region 
"is caused by" others.  The average across the two cases is also indicated, as is the average per 
region under each lag structure. 
This table indicates some interesting results.  First, Auckland (RC02) is not 
influenced strongly by other regions; nor does it have a strong causative influence. Second, 
regions with the strongest influence on others are agricultural (especially sheep and beef) 
based regions: Hawkes Bay (RC06) and Canterbury (RC13), followed by Nelson-MT (RC11) 
and Taranaki (RC07), in turn followed by Manawatu-Wanganui (RC08) and Southland 
(RC15).  Third, there are four regions that receive material causation from others: Northland 
(RC01), Waikato (RC03), Taranaki (RC07) and Nelson-MT (RC11).  By contrast, Bay of 
Plenty (RC04) and Southland (RC15) receive very little, if any, influence from others.  In 
addition, Hawkes Bay (RC06), Wellington (RC09) and the West Coast (RC12), as well as 
Auckland, receive relatively little influence from others. 
These results
35 are consistent with what may be viewed as "conventional wisdom" 
that agricultural developments have an influence over time on economic outcomes in other 
parts of the country. Auckland and Wellington regions, however, are moderately insulated 
from these effects, but at the same time do not have major causative influence on other 
regions.  Their economies (or, at least, their house prices) appear to be influenced by different 
factors than those in other regions. 
We have also conducted GCTs for all combinations of TLAs (in each direction) 
within RCs.  We do not present the results here since: (a) they contain a great deal of detail; 
and (b) no consistent pattern of results was found.  Only two of the RCs had more than one 
third of the GCTs significant at the 10% level.  One was largely rural (Nelson-MT with 58% 
tests significant) and one was largely urban (Auckland with 45% significant).  
We found instances both of city causing rural, and rural causing urban.  An 
example of the former is WTKI and COTA both causing DUNE (with no causality in the 
                                                           
35 If interpreted to mean that price developments in "caused by" regions are, in part, attributable to prior price 
developments in "causal" regions. 
26  
other direction).  An example of the latter is NAPI causing CHAW (with no causality in the 
other direction).  Overall, there was no clear pattern of urban causing rural or vice versa.  This 
is not necessarily surprising, since prices in neighbouring TLAs may be jointly and 
contemporaneously determined by similar shocks (as demonstrated in the long run analysis), 
reducing the prospects of finding significant intertemporal causation. 
5.3  Time series analysis conclusions 
We summarise the main findings of our time series analysis as follows: 
•  Most real RC house price series are non-stationary [I(1)] indicating that there 
are permanent effects of price shocks hitting RCs.  Some price series have a deterministic 
trend embedded in them indicating that real prices are trending (generally upwards) in those 
RCs even in the absence of economic shocks. 
•  In general, RC house prices do not move closely together in the long term, 
even after allowing for the influence of deterministic time trend effects.  Greater long-term 
co-movement is observed across the South Island than across the North Island or between the 
two islands.  House prices in northern RCs tend to be trending upwards relative to prices in 
southern RCs. 
•  There is greater evidence of long-term co-movement across TLAs within RCs 
than between RCs, possibly indicating similar house price effects of shocks impacting within 
RCs. 
•  There are some indications of house price over-shooting in a majority of RCs 
in response to shocks; whether this is due to compositional or other factors is an open 
question. 
•  There is a much higher degree of contemporaneous correlation (short-run co-
movement) across RCs than is the case for long-run co-movement.  However, there is 
considerably less short-run co-movement across TLAs within RCs and nationwide both 
relative to RC short-run co-movement and relative to long-run TLA co-movement. 
•  Agricultural regions (especially sheep- and beef-based regions) appear to have 
price developments that precede developments in a number of other regions.  
•  Wellington and Auckland are relatively immune to these influences.   
Conversely neither has a strong short run influence on other regions' prices, indicating that 
their economies are moderately separable from other regions over short time horizons. 
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6  LONG RUN RESULTS 
6.1  Outline and data 
Our analysis of long-run determinants of RC real house prices takes the theoretical 
approach outlined in equation (3.5) as the starting point.  As discussed, our house price data is 
unadjusted sales price data deflated by the CPI (excluding interest and credit charges).  We 
enter this variable in logarithmic form and denote it as LPZZ for region ZZ. 
Our income variable for each region is the National Bank of New Zealand Regional 
Economic Activity Index (LBNZZ)
36.  Each of these series is available quarterly from 
1981(1)-2002(4).  LBNZZ is included in logarithmic form (so the coefficient can be 
interpreted as an elasticity). 
Our user-cost (UC) index is based on that used by OD&R. Like OD&R, we include 
the UC only from 1985(1) onwards, being the period following financial liberalisation; an 
estimated constant term is used to proxy financial conditions from 1981-1984.  We use the 
90-day bank bill rate (i90) as our interest rate (implicitly allowing the margin between 90 day 
rates and mortgage rates to be reflected in the constant term of the equation
37) and use the 
latest annual CPI inflation rate (π)
38 to proxy general inflation expectations.  Both these 
aspects are as in OD&R. 
There is one material modification and some minor modifications to the OD&R UC 
variable.  The main modification is that the tax component is omitted, both for theoretical and 
practical reasons.  The theoretical reason is that, in New Zealand, mortgage interest is not tax-
deductible (unlike many other countries), nor are capital gains from housing taxed.  If loan 
finance is the marginal source of finance for housing then there is no tax relief on the housing 
loan and no tax to pay on the housing services. Thus no tax rate should appear in the UC 
variable.  If, however, other taxable investment opportunities constituted the marginal source 
of finance for funding housing then the tax rate should be entered into UC, since the 
opportunity cost is taxed.
39  This would then lead us into the practical problem that different 
borrowers/investors face different tax rates and the relationship of these tax rates to each other 
                                                           
36 This data is sourced directly from the National Bank of New Zealand Limited. We thank the NBNZ for 
making this data available for the full period. The data is available over a shorter period from the Bank's website: 
www.nbnz.co.nz . 
37 We also allow the depreciation term to be reflected in the equation's constant term. 
38 For this purpose we use the CPI excluding interest and credit (as elsewhere in this paper) and also excluding 
the effect of the imposition and subsequent increase of GST, which caused upward shifts in the price level but 
which are unlikely to have had a major effect on forward-looking inflation expectations. 
39 This discussion reflects the non-neutral treatment of housing in the New Zealand taxation system. 
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has varied over time.  Entering a single tax rate into the equation (even if allowed to vary over 
time) would not adequately capture the taxation effect for different individuals.  For these two 
reasons (especially the theoretical reason) we omit the taxation term. 
The first minor modification is that we drop the denominator term (1+r), but given 
that r ≅ 0, this makes very little difference to the UC measure.  Doing so enables us to place 
both the depreciation term and the gap between mortgage and 90-day rates into the equation 
constant.  
The second minor modification is our calculation of ġ (the expected rate of real 
house price change).  OD&R use real house price developments over the previous five years 
to calculate this variable.  We use the past four years (using the average of the first and fourth 
years) to calculate this variable. Doing so enables us to use the 1981-1984 data for our first 
post-liberalisation observation in 1985(1).  A related, and more important, modification is 
that, since our analysis is region-specific, we calculate ġ for each region (ġZZ for region ZZ).  
Thus regional UCs differ from each other.  This approach is consistent with theory, since 
expected capital gains in a region (which we assume are related to past experience) should 
influence region-specific house prices.  The sensitivity of results to the inclusion or exclusion 
of ġZZ in the UCZZ term will be tested in future work. 
Combining these effects, our user cost index for region ZZ from 1985(1) - 2002(4) 
is defined as: 
  UCZZ = i90 - π – ġZZ (6.1) 
Each UCZZ is entered in level form in the house price equation so the coefficient 
can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity.  For the period prior to 1985(1), we enter a constant 
term [=1 from 1981(1)-1984(4) and 0 otherwise] which is freely estimated for each RC.  This 
term is denoted UCD. 
We are currently lacking direct data on other variables appearing in (3.5) relating to 
the stock of houses (h) in each RC and elements of ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL and 
ZCONSTRUCT.
40  Of these variables, h is theoretically most important. 
The stock of houses is a slow-moving variable, so almost certainly contributes little 
to quarter-by-quarter or even to year-by-year house price developments.  However the trend 
element in the variable is likely to be important as a long run influence on house prices. We 
attempt to capture the housing variable as follows. 
                                                           
40 We expect to have greater access to relevant data for later papers in this research programme. 
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For the period 1990-2002, we have QVNZ annual data on the number of valuation 
assessments in each region.  Assessments are generally undertaken within TLAs on a three-
yearly cycle so there are discrete jumps in the number of assessments at certain points.  We 
smooth these jumps by passing a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter through each region's series to 
proxy the trend number of assessments.
41  This filtered series is used as our proxy for the 
number of houses in each region from 1990(4) - 2002(4). 
Prior to 1990(4), we use a proxy based on the number of house sales.  We have data 
on the number of house sales in each region for each quarter of our analysis.  House sales 
numbers are highly volatile, but it is reasonable to expect that over long periods, sales 
numbers in any area are related to the stock of houses in that area.  The trend in house sales 
should therefore be positively related to the trend in house numbers.  We capture the trend 
component in house sales by passing an HP filter through the series of quarterly house sales
42 
and then scale the resulting series so that the 1990(4) estimate of the filtered series equals that 
derived from the assessments data.  The resulting combined variable is entered in logarithmic 
form and is denoted LASZZ for region ZZ. 
There may be some weaknesses in these derived data as a measure of the housing 
stock.
43  For this reason, we also include a quadratic time trend (TIME and TIME
2) in the 
equation to supplement (or supplant) LASZZ.  The quadratic time trend may also proxy 
effects within ZHOUSE, ZLOCAL and ZCONSTRUCT if any of these vectors include 
variables that in part are deterministic functions of time. 
For each RC, we therefore initially estimate an equation of form: 
 LPZZ = α0 + α1LNBZZ + α2UCZZ + α3UCD + α4LASZZ + α5TIME + α6TIME
2  (6.2) 
The key parameters of interest, and expected signs given the theoretical derivation 
in section 3, are: α1 (+), α2 (-), and α4 (-). 
                                                           
41 We first transform the annual data to quarterly data using linear interpolation between December quarters and 
then use the standard HP quarterly smoothing parameter of λ = 1600. 
42 In order to capture the trend in this variable, we use a larger value (14400) for λ than the commonly chosen 
parameter (1600). This is because we are using a volatile flow variable (sales) to capture a relatively stable stock 
variable (house numbers) [14400 is commonly chosen to smooth monthly flow data]. The resulting series, by 
visual inspection, behaves much more like a stock series than does a series generated using the lower smoothing 
parameter.  
43 The series used here, based on spliced data from the assessments and sales data does, however, perform better 
than a series based on the sales data alone over the whole period. Another approach to formulating a housing 
stock variable is to aggregate building consents data over time, but this data is again only available for the 1990s. 
This approach will be investigated in future work.  
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6.2  Long run results: OLS 
Table 25 presents the results of estimating (6.2) as an unrelated set of individual 
OLS equations.  If we treat the UCD term as part of the UCZZ term (which conceptually it 
is), we have four I(1) variables plus a constant and quadratic time trend in each equation.  For 
each equation, we test whether the variables for that region are co-integrated by testing the 
residual for a unit root, using an ADF test with the critical values estimated by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993).
44  We also present the R
2 and standard error (s.e.) for each equation.  A 
number of key results stand out. 
First, the coefficient on LNBZZ is in all cases positive with a median of 1.23. 
While t-statistics do not have conventional significance levels in the presence of integrated 
series, the result that all of the 14 t-statistics exceed 2.0, with 11 exceeding 3.0, implies an 
important effect of regional economic conditions on regional real house prices.  A 1% rise in 
real economic activity results in at least a 1% rise in real house prices in the majority of 
regions.  Given the presence of time trends in the equation, this result cannot be attributed to a 
secular (deterministic) growth component. 
Second, the UCZZ term is negative in all cases.  In eleven cases the "t-statistic" is 
greater than 2.0 and in 9 cases it exceeds 3.0.   The median value of the α2 coefficient is  -
0.0075, implying that a 1 percentage point increase in the real user cost of capital results in a 
long run fall in real house prices of approximately 0.8%. 
Third, our proxy for the real housing stock, LASZZ has the expected negative 
coefficient in 13 of the 14 equations, 7 of which have "t-statistics" greater than 3.0.  At least 
half the coefficients on each of TIME and TIME
2 have t-statistics >3.0 indicating that the 
quadratic time trend components are helpful in explaining real house price developments in 
some regions.  Whether this is because they are supplementing the LASZZ variables as 
proxies for the housing stock or whether they are proxying for effects within ZHOUSE, 
ZLOCAL and/or ZCONSTRUCT is unknown.  The results in relation to the housing stock are 
not quite as robust across RCs as for the other variables, but still indicate that our proxy for 
the housing stock in each RC appears reasonable. 
Fourth, nine of the equations are co-integrated at the 5% level, six of which are co-
integrated at 1%.  The remaining five equations, while failing to reject the null hypothesis of a 
                                                           
44 Critical values are: -5.27 (1%); -4.73 (5%); -4.45 (10%) using τctt with m=4. Note that our assessment that the 
LBNZZ, UCZZ and LSHPZZ terms are I(1) is based on previous work and is still subject to formal testing here. 
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unit root in the residual, nevertheless have moderately high ADF statistics (the minimum 
absolute value being -3.12)
 45.  Overall, these results suggest that we have picked out the 
major, if not the exclusive, long run determinants of real house prices at the RC level.  The 
standard error of the equations varies from 0.0323 to 0.0776, with the median standard error 
indicating an average error of approximately 4%. 
6.3  Long run results: panel 
The 14 RC real house price equations can be estimated as a panel using SUR 
(seemingly unrelated regressions) estimation.  In this estimation we restrict the coefficients on 
each of α1, α2 and α4 to be identical across each region.  The results give the "average" effect 
on real house prices across New Zealand of each of regional economic activity, the user cost 
of capital and the housing stock.
46  One advantage of estimating the equations in this manner 
is that much more precise estimates of the parameters of interest are obtained. 
We find long run estimates (t-statistics in parentheses) as follows: 
  α1:    0.9968  (19.87) 
α2:   -0.0106  (20.43) 
α4:   -0.6381  (11.03) 
The panel results indicate that a 1% increase in regional economic activity boosts 
real house prices by 1%, while a 1% increase in the housing stock lowers real house prices by 
just over 0.6%.  A one percentage point increase in the user-cost of capital is estimated to 
decrease long run real house prices by 1.06%. 
As anticipated, the results are precisely determined, with t-statistics ranging from 
11.03 – 20.43.  The median standard error rises only slightly to 0.0462.  These results are still 
preliminary and subject to testing in future work.  Nevertheless, they appear plausible in terms 
of the theoretical specification and are consistent with the single equation estimates already 
presented. 
                                                           
45 The nature of the test is that we are testing for rejection of a unit root; we are not testing for rejection of 
stationarity. Based on the nine RCs that reject a unit root, it is reasonable to interpret the remaining five ADFs as 
consistent with the presence of stationarity in the residuals. 
46 The estimates reported here are not weighted for region size. Future work will investigate the effects of doing 
so. 
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7  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our major time-series conclusions are presented in section 5.3, while the panel 
results in section 6.3 are a reasonable summary of our (still preliminary) findings with respect 
to real house prices at the RC level. In addition to these results, we reiterate the results of our 
convergence/divergence tests (section 4).  Here we found higher-priced regions experiencing 
faster house price growth than did lower-priced regions since 1991, but not before that date. 
Future work will conduct additional testing of the long run RC equations as a panel 
dataset.  We will then estimate the dynamic adjustments to long-run values for the RCs.  It is 
at this stage that we expect to observe impacts of local regulatory and related factors on house 
price developments. 
Following completion of the data-derivation work for TLAs, the long-run and 
dynamic estimates will be estimated at that level of disaggregation.  We expect that the 
impact of economic and other shocks should be pronounced at this level.  For instance, based 
on the effects on house prices of regional economic activity indicated at the RC level, we 
anticipate that shocks to commodity prices, tourist flows and migration will impact heavily on 
(at least some) TLA house price developments.  Local regulatory and related factors are also 
likely to be important at this level of disaggregation. 
Finally, in this research programme, we will draw out the implications of our 
empirical work for policy issues and for further related research.  One aspect of this related 
research is anticipated to be an examination of the links between house prices and the house 
rental market at a disaggregated level.  Another aspect could be to use the valuation data, 
which is available at mesh-block level, to analyse the effects on wealth distributions at a 
micro-level arising from house price developments.  A further issue to examine is the effect of 
house price developments on certain groups considered important for social policy (e.g. 
children, especially in low-income households, and the elderly). Finally, policy changes, such 
as changes to school zoning boundaries, can be analysed at this level, so increasing our 
understanding of the housing market effects of other public policy decisions. 
8 REFERENCES 
Bate, Richard, Richard Best & Alan Holmans (eds) (2000) On the Move: The Housing 
Consequences of Migration, published by YPS for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
United Kingdom. 
Can, A. (1992) "Specification and Estimation of Hedonic Housing Price Models", Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, 22(3), 453-474. 
33  
Capozza, Dennis, Patric Hendershott, Charlotte Mack & Christopher Mayer (2002) 
"Determinants of Real House Price Dynamics", National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 9262, NBER, Cambridge, Mass. 
Case, Karl and Christopher Mayer (1996) "Housing Price Dynamics within a Metropolitan 
Area", Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26, 387-407. 
Davidson, Russell & James MacKinnon (1993) Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dubin R.A. (1992) "Spatial Autocorrelation and Neighborhood Quality", Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, 22(3), 433-452. 
Evans, Lewis, Arthur Grimes and Bryce Wilkinson with David Teece (1996) "Economic 
Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency", Journal of Economic 
Literature, 34, 1856-1902. 
Genesove, David & Christopher Mayer (2001) "Loss Aversion and Seller Behaviour: 
Evidence from the Housing Market", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1233-
1260. 
Glaeser, Edward & Joseph Gyourko (2001) Urban Decline and Durable Housing, Discussion 
Paper 1931, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Glaeser, Edward & Joseph Gyourko (2002) The Impact of Zoning on Housing Affordability, 
Discussion Paper 1948, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts [subsequently published as "Zoning's Steep Price", 
Regulation, 25(3), Fall 2002]. 
Grimes, Arthur, Grant Spencer, Kevin Duggan and Rodney Dick (1983) A Revised Reserve 
Bank Core Model with SNA Data, Research Paper No. 37, Wellington: Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. 
Lattimore, Ralph (2003) Long Run Trends in New Zealand Industry Assistance, Report to 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Trust, NZIER, Wellington. 
Mankiw, Gregory & David Weil (1989) "The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust and the Housing 
Market", Regional Science and Urban Economics, 19, May, 235-258. 
O'Connor, Kevin & Ernest Healy (2002) The Links Between Housing Markets and Labour 
Markets in Melbourne, Research and Policy Bulletin, Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute (AHURI), Melbourne. 
O'Donovan, Brendan and David Rae (1997) "The Determinants of House Prices in New 
Zealand: An Aggregate and Regional Analysis", New Zealand Economic Papers, 
31(2), 175-198. 
Pain, N & P. Westaway (1996) Modelling Structural Change in the UK Housing Market: A 
Comparison of Alternative House Price Models, National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, Working Paper No. 98. 
Savage, John, Suzi Kerr and Stephen Topliss (1989) The Private Residential Rental Market in 




Table 1: RC/TLA Correspondence and Name Definitions 
RC 
Abbreviation RC  Name 
TLA 
Abbreviatio
n TLA  Name 
RC01  Northland  FARN  Far North District 
   WHAN  Whangarei  District 
   KAIP  Kaipara  District 
RC02 Auckland  RODN  Rodney  District 
    NSHO  North Shore City 
   WTKR  Waitakere  City 
   AUCK  Auckland  City 
   MANU  Manukau  City 
   PAPA  Papakura  District 
   FRAN  Franklin  District 
RC03 Waikato  THAM 
Thames-Coromandel 
District 
   HAUR  Hauraki  District 
   WKAT  Waikato  District 
   MATA  Matamata-Piako  District 
   HAMI  Hamilton  City 
   WAIP  Waipa  District 
   OTOR  Otorohanga  District 
    SWKA  South Waikato District 
   WTOM  Waitomo  District 
   TAUP  Taupo  District 
RC04  Bay of Plenty  WBOP 
Western Bay of Plenty 
District 
   TAUR  Tauranga  District 
   ROTO  Rotorua  District 
   WHAK  Whakatane  District 
   KAWE  Kawerau  District 
   OPOT  Opotiki  District 
RC05 Gisborne  GISB  Gisborne  District 
RC06  Hawke's Bay  WROA  Wairoa District 
   HAST  Hastings  District 
   NAPI  Napier  City 
   CHAW 
Central Hawke's Bay 
District 
RC07  Taranaki  NEWP  New Plymouth District 
   STRA  Stratford  District 
    STAR  South Taranaki District 
RC08 
Manawatu-
Wanganui RUAP  Ruapehu  District 
   WANG  Wanagnui  District 
35  
   RANG  Rangatikei  District 
   MANA  Manawatu  District 
    PALM  Palmerston North City 
   TARA  Tararua  District 
   HORO  Horowhenua  District 
RC09  Wellington  KAPI  Kapiti Coast District 
   PORI  Porirua  City 
    UHUT  Upper Hutt City 
    HUTT  Lower Hutt City 
   WELL  Wellington  City 
   MAST  Masterton  District 
   CART  Carterton  District 
    SWRP  South Wairarapa District 
RC11 Nelson-MT*  TASM  Tasman  District 
   NELS  Nelson  City 
   MARL  Marlborough  District 
RC12  West Coast  BULL  Buller District 
   GREY  Grey  District 
   WEST  Westland  District 
RC13 Canterbury KAIK  Kaikoura  District 
   HURU  Hurunui  District 
   WMAK  Waimakariri  District 
   CHRI  Christchurch  City 
    BANK  Banks Peninsula District 
   SELW  Selwyn  District 
   ASHB  Ashburton  District 
   TIMA  Timaru  District 
   MACK  Mackenzie  District 
   WMAT  Waimate  District 
RC14 Otago  WTKI  Waitaki  District 
    COTA  Central Otago District 
   QUEE  Queenstown-Lakes  District 
   DUNE  Dunedin  City 
   CLUT  Clutha  District 
RC15 Southland  SOUT  Southland  District 
   GORE  Gore  District 
   INVE  Invercargill  City 
 
*Nelson-Marlborough-Tasman [officially regions 16-18; there is no RC10] 
NB:  TLAs are generally denoted by the first four letters of their name.  TLA names starting 
with "Wai" have the first 3 letters shortened to W.  Directional and spatial epithets (North, 
East, South, West, Central, Upper) are shortened to N, E, S, W, C, U respectively.  The only 
exceptions to the above naming conventions (to avoid duplication or to use conventional 
abbreviations) are: Waitakere (WTKR), Western Bay of Plenty (WBOP), Lower Hutt 
(HUTT), South Wairarapa (SWRP), Waitaki (WTKI). 
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FARN  174 66  159 0 1  9.1 
WHAN  152 34  342 0 0  4.5 
KAIP  140  71 67 27  2  9.7 
RODN  245 128 329 0 0  4.2 
NSHO  299 81  996 0 0  3.8 
WTKR  209 87  897 0 0  3.5 
AUCK  342 152 1740  0 0  3.4 
MANU 257  95  1073  0  0  4.1 
PAPA  212 64  167 0 0  7.9 
FRAN  190 89  146 0 0  7.0 
THAM  196 114 25  0 0  5.9 
HAUR  115  58 77 4  2  8.6 
WKAT  127 68  108 0 2  8.9 
MATA  131 39  108 0 0  7.8 
HAMI  176 45  584 0 0  3.2 
WAIP  162 47  154 0 0  5.3 
OTOR  95 28 21 88  10  10.7 
SWKA 49  -42  114  1  0  8.4 
WTOM  67 -16  32 86  5  11.9 
TAUP  175 66  245 0 1  6.9 
WBOP  194 85  135 0 0  6.9 
TAUR  199 35  560 0 0  4.0 
ROTO  136 27  387 0 0  5.0 
WHAK  167 37  125 0 0  7.4 
KAWE  49 -50  40 63  2  9.9 
OPOT  118  23 24 88  7  11.4 
GISB  100 2  168 0 0  5.6 
WROA  61 -29  26 88  7  12.0 
HAST  142 35  256 0 0  4.5 
NAPI  154 34  286 0 0  4.0 
CHAW  96 13 48 45  2  9.1 
NEWP  117 14  371 0 0  4.9 
STRA  69 -13  38 76  2  11.4 
STAR 72  -6  115  0  0  10.1 
RUAP  52 -34  55 41  3  9.8 
WANG 77  5  253  0  0  5.1 
RANG 55  -33  136  5  4  11.7 
MANA  100 19  116 0 0  7.7 
PALM  136 20  377 0 0  4.1 
TARA  62 -15  84 2  0  10.1 
HORO  83 13 171  0  0  6.2 
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KAPI  176 83  255 0 0  5.5 
PORI  195 93  206 0 0  7.3 
UHUT  159 48  186 0 0  4.3 
HUTT  178 74  510 0 0  4.5 
WELL  268 110 838 0 0  3.7 
MAST  108 29  130 0 0  6.3 
CART  109  47 33 85  2  9.7 
SWRP  121  86 50 48  1  11.4 
TASM  174 57  179 0 0  6.8 
NELS  173 44  270 0 0  5.3 
MARL  137 34  220 0 0  5.1 
KAIK  132  81 16 88  8  13.2 
BULL  56 41 59 21  8  11.2 
GREY  87 60 79 9  13  11.8 
WEST  68 15 36 78  8  13.0 
HURU  123  88 41 70  6  12.5 
WMAK  147 63  182 0 0  5.3 
CHRI 160  66  1941  0  0  2.6 
BANK  162 126 67  15  0  9.9 
SELW  148  56 57 27  6  8.1 
ASHB  90 14 122  0  1  6.6 
TIMA 87  -2  249  0  0  5.7 
MACK  69 0  29 80  12  12.1 
WMAT  61 -20  26 88  8  12.6 
WTKI 65  -12  127  0  1  10.3 
COTA  126  19 99 3  3  10.3 
QUEE  296 143 101 6 1  8.9 
DUNE  103 24  747 0 0  4.1 
CLUT  50 -19  84 1  6  11.7 
SOUT 74  8  113  0  1  13.6 
GORE  59 -40  70 10  1  11.2 
INVE 65  -31  395  0  0  4.8 
 
RC01  157 46  568 0 0  5.2 
RC02  282 111 5349  0 0  2.7 
RC03 166  61  1658  0  0  3.5 
RC04 168  38  1270  0  0  3.0 
RC05  100 2  168 0 0  5.6 
RC06  142 32  616 0 0  3.0 
RC07  106 12  524 0 0  4.5 
RC08  98 12 1191  0  0  4.1 
RC09 203  87  2206  0  0  3.0 
RC11  162 46  669 0 0  3.2 
RC12  63 24 173  0  7  8.5 
RC13 146  58  2727  0  0  2.7 
RC14 117  38  1158  0  0  4.1 
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RC15 66  -27  578  0  0  4.8 
Notes to Table 2: Smoothing adjustments to house price data were made as follows [year(qtr)]: 
FARN   2000(1) 
KAIP   1988(2) 2000(1) 
HAUR   1983(1)  1983(2) 
WKAT  2000(4)  2002(3) 
OTOR    1982(3) 1983(2) 1984(1) 1984(2) 1986(3)   1988(1) 1996(2) 1998(2) 2000(3) 2001(3) 
WTOM   1983(1) 1984(2) 1985(4) 1986(1) 1993(2) 
TAUP   1984(4) 
KAWE   1999(2) 2000(4) 
OPOT    1986(3) 1987(1) 1992(3) 1996(4) 2000(2)   2001(3) 2002(3) 
WROA   1990(4) 1997(1) 1997(2) 1998(3) 1999(2)   2000(4) 2001(4) 
CHAW  1994(4)  1995(3) 
STRA   1992(2)  1999(1) 
RUAP    1995(4) 1997(2) 1998(4) 
RANG    1982(3) 1982(4) 1998(2) 1998(4) 
CART   1982(4)  1993(4) 
SWRP   2001(3) 
BULL    1983(1) 1983(3) 1985(1) 1986(1) 1993(1)   1994(3) 1999(3) 2000(4) 
GREY    1981(4) 1982(2) 1983(2) 1983(3) 1984(1)   1984(2) 1994(3) 1995(2)   1995(4) 1998(4) 
  2000(2)  2000(3)  2002(1) 
WEST   1981(4) 1984(1) 1984(4) 1986(1) 1991(4)   1993(1) 2000(4) 2001(2) 
KAIK    1981(4) 1984(4) 1993(1) 1996(4) 1998(1)   1998(2) 1998(4) 1999(4) 
HURU    1981(4) 1985(2) 1988(2) 1991(2) 1993(1)   1998(4) 
SELW*    1981(1) 1981(3) 1982(1) 1987(4) 1992(1)   1992(2) 
ASHB   2001(1) 
MACK   1981(1) 1981(4) 1982(2) 1983(2) 1983(3)   1984(2) 1984(3) 1984(4) 1989(2) 1992(3)  
  1998(2)  1998(3) 
WMAT   1981(1) 1981(3) 1988(1) 1989(2) 1995(4)   1996(1) 1997(4) 2001(3) 
WTKI   1999(4) 
COTA    1995(2) 1995(3) 2000(4) 
QUEE   1986(4) 
CLUT    1982(3) 1986(3) 1987(4) 1991(3) 1999(2)   2002(1) 
SOUT   1984(1) 
GORE   1997(3) 
 
*In addition, the values for SELW 2001(4)-2002(4) were inferred from neighbouring TLAs as 
described in the text. 
 
Table 3: Test of Relationship Between Initial House Price & Later Growth 




0.79 3.17  0.00  0.12 
 1
st Half  0.13  0.97  0.34  0.01 
 2
nd Half  0.42  4.60  0.00  0.23 
RC Whole 
Sample 
1.03 2.16  0.05  0.28 
 1
st Half  0.08  0.29  0.78  0.01 
 2
nd Half  0.53  3.41  0.01  0.49 
 
*"Coefficient " reports the value for β in the cross-sectional regression: 
%∆P = α + βP0 + ε 
where: %∆P is the percentage change in the real house price over the relevant period, P0 is the 
real house price at the start of the relevant period, and ε is an error term (assumed to have the 
standard properties) 
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Table 4: UNIT ROOT TESTS on Ln (Real Median Sales Price)*  









RC01  0.898 0.921 0.000 0.000 
RC02 0.767  0.852  0.000 
0.016 
0.000 
RC03 0.649  0.881  0.000 
0.037 
0.000 
RC04  0.810 0.869 0.000 0.000 
RC05  0.507 0.209 0.000 0.000 
RC06  0.857 0.884 0.000 0.000 
RC07  0.682 0.375 0.000 0.000 
RC08 0.122  0.046  0.000 0.000 
RC09 0.661  0.805  0.001 
0.075 
0.000 





   
RC13 0.473  0.283  0.000 
0.062 
0.000 
RC14  0.210 0.569 0.000 0.000 
RC15  0.802 0.422 0.000 0.000 
 
*p-value for augmented Dickey-Fuller test using Shwartz Information Criterion to select lag 
length.   
The four columns test for stationarity for each series respectively in: levels with deterministic 
trend and constant, levels with constant only, 1st difference with constant, and 1st difference 
without constant. The first figure in each cell is the p-value on the test to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. A second figure is included in a cell only if the p-value of the first 
figure <0.100 and the p-value on the Trend (1st column) or Constant (3rd column) <0.100 
[this second p-value is given as the second figure in these cases]. 
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Table  5:  Unit Root (Co-integration) Tests on Ln(Real Median Sales Price) Between Pairs of Regions 
without deterministic trend (bottom left) & with deterministic trend (top right) [p-values] 
                              RC01 RC02 RC03 RC04 RC05 RC06 RC07 RC08 RC09 RC11 RC12 RC13 RC14 RC15
RC01  -  0.79 0.78 0.38 0.73 0.59 0.24 0.86 0.60 0.80 0.61 0.97 0.81 0.86 
RC02                0.31 -  0.16  0.50 0.50 0.77 0.00  0.07  0.14  0.56  0.04  0.79 0.57 0.77
RC03                  0.40 0.40 -  0.01  0.07  0.21  0.09  0.52 0.45 0.09 0.06  0.76 0.59 0.64
RC04  0.14  0.36  0.01  -  0.07  0.51  0.19  0.67              0.53 0.41 0.24 0.74 0.62 0.46
RC05  0.82                        0.83 0.52 0.42 - 0.00  0.00 0.74 0.73 0.65 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.00
RC06                  0.31 0.46 0.16  0.27  0.09  -  0.00  0.62 0.71 0.13 0.08 0.87 0.65 0.00 
RC07  0.69                    0.76 0.83 0.55 0.00  0.42 -  0.46 0.79 0.33 0.15  0.29  0.06 0.00
RC08  0.86            0.86 0.83 0.74 0.42 0.69 0.18  - 0.47  0.17  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.53 
RC09  0.16  0.45                        0.31 0.21 0.55 0.25 0.49 0.48 -  0.69 0.16 0.87 0.41 0.71
RC11  0.57                      0.70 0.72 0.36 0.63 0.03  0.48 0.35 0.33 -  0.01 0.89 0.00 0.08 
RC12                    0.26 0.19  0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.00 -  0.00  0.00  0.06 
RC13                  0.29 0.91 0.57 0.07  0.40  0.12  0.29 0.35 0.59 0.38 0.00  - 0.02  0.93
RC14  0.49                      0.52 0.42 0.34 0.66 0.30 0.44 0.71 0.14  0.00 0.00 0.00 -  0.03 
RC15  0.90                        0.59 0.68 0.75 0.39 0.71 0.36 0.22 0.23 0.36 0.39 0.12  0.57 - 
Where each of the trend and the ADF is significant at p<0.200 (top right of the table) the trend coefficient is indicated below. For 
instance, the Auckland region (RC02) has had trend growth in its real median sales price of 0.05% per quarter relative to the 
Waikato region (RC03). 
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Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
RC02 - RC03     0.0005  [0.05]      RC02 - RC07     0.0019  [0.00] 
RC02 - RC08     0.0013  [0.00]      RC02 - RC09     0.0004  [0.01] 
RC02 - RC12     0.0013  [0.01]      RC03 - RC04     0.0003  [0.11] 
RC03 - RC05     0.0012  [0.00]      RC03 - RC07     0.0012  [0.01] 
RC03 - RC11     0.0008  [0.01]      RC03 - RC12     0.0005  [0.14] 
RC04 - RC05     0.0010  [0.01]      RC04 - RC07     0.0007  [0.02] 
RC05 - RC06    -0.0015  [0.00]      RC05 - RC12    -0.0008  [0.07] 
RC05 - RC13    -0.0009  [0.02]      RC05 - RC14    -0.0009  [0.01] 
RC05 - RC15     0.0024  [0.00]      RC06 - RC07     0.0018  [0.00] 
RC06 - RC15     0.0034  [0.00]      RC07 - RC12    -0.0006  [0.17] 
RC07 - RC14    -0.0008  [0.02]      RC07 - RC15     0.0019  [0.00] 
RC08 - RC11    -0.0005  [0.03]      RC08 - RC12    -0.0015  [0.00] 
RC08 - RC13    -0.0009  [0.01]      RC08 - RC14    -0.0013  [0.00] 
RC11 - RC15     0.0019  [0.01]      RC12 - RC13    -0.0004  [0.20] 
RC12 - RC15     0.0019  [0.01]      RC14 - RC15     0.0022  [0.00] 
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Table 6: Unit Root Tests - Northland Region (RC01) 
          Far North Whangarei Kaipara
Far North  -  0.00    0.00
Whangarei  0.00  -  0.00 
Kaipara  0.00  0.13  - 
 
Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]   
FARN - WHAN  0.0008   [0.04]      FARN - KAIP   -0.0010  [0.01] 
WHAN - KAIP  -0.0014  [0.00] 
 
Table 7: Unit Root Tests - Auckland Region (RC02)  
    Rodney  North Shore     Waitakere  Auckland  Manukau  Papakura  Franklin
Rodney -  0.01 0.00  0.19 0.00 0.00  0.00 
North Shore  0.00  -        0.01 0.00  0.14  0.00 0.30
Waitakere  0.00            0.05 - 0.41 0.14 0.02 0.41 
Auckland              0.33 0.61 0.74 - 0.09 0.04 0.51 
Manukau  0.00  0.18          0.10 0.19 -  0.00 0.00
Papakura  0.02      0.00 0.01 0.37  0.02  -  0.00 
Franklin  0.06  0.10    0.15 0.58  0.11  0.00  - 
Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
RODN – NSHO   0.0007  [0.01]      RODN – WTKR   0.0005  [0.02] 
RODN – AUCK  -0.0005  [0.03]      RODN – PAPA   0.0020   [0.00] 
RODN – FRAN   0.0009  [0.01]      NSHO – AUCK  -0.0015  [0.00] 
NSHO – MANU  -0.0004  [0.06]      NSHO – PAPA   0.0006  [0.05] 
WTKR – MANU  -0.0003  [0.11]      WTKR – PAPA   0.0005  [0.11] 
AUCK – MANU   0.0006  [0.03]      AUCK – PAPA   0.0017  [0.00] 
MANU – PAPA   0.0016  [0.00]      MANU – FRAN   0.0006  [0.05] 
PAPA – FRAN  -0.0009  [0.01] 
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Table 8: Unit Root Tests - Waikato Region (RC03) 
                      Thames Hauraki Waikato Hamilton Matamata Waipa Otorohanga S.Waikato Waitomo Taupo
Thames    -  0.00 0.00 0.02  0.24 0.72  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00
Hauraki              0.29 -  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Waikato  0.00               0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Hamilton                0.44 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00  0.02  0.00 0.00 0.11 
Matamata                0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.23 
Waipa 0.30              0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01 
Otorohanga                    0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -  0.02 0.00 0.00
S.Waikato                    0.77 0.69 0.94 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.32 -  0.00 0.02
Waitomo                  0.78 0.41 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.00 0.00 -  0.00 
Taupo  0.18  0.00                0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.24 - 
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
THAM – HAUR   0.0031  [0.00]        THAM – WKAT   0.0016  [0.00] 
THAM - HAMI   0.0011  [0.01]        THAM – OTOR   0.0034  [0.00] 
THAM – SWKA   0.0049  [0.00]        THAM – WTOM   0.0064  [0.00] 
THAM - TAUP   0.0021  [0.00]        HAUR – MATA   0.0007  [0.09] 
HAUR - OTOR   0.0017  [0.00]        HAUR – SWKA   0.0045  [0.00] 
HAUR – WTOM   0.0043  [0.00]        WKAT – OTOR   0.0011  [0.05] 
WKAT – SWKA   0.0040  [0.00]        WKAT – WTOM   0.0024  [0.00] 
HAMI - OTOR   0.0007  [0.17]        HAMI - SWKA   0.0041  [0.00] 
HAMI – WTOM   0.0032  [0.00]        MATA - OTOR   0.0008  [0.11] 
MATA – SWKA   0.0051  [0.00]        MATA – WTOM   0.0041  [0.00] 
WAIP - OTOR   0.0008  [0.13]        WAIP - SWKA   0.0047  [0.00] 
WAIP – WTOM   0.0034  [0.00]        OTOR – SWKA   0.0029  [0.00] 
OTOR – WTOM   0.0024  [0.00]        OTOR – TAUP  -0.0014  [0.01] 
SWKA – WTOM  -0.0020  [0.00]        SWKA – TAUP  -0.0035  [0.00] 
WTOM – TAUP  -0.0031  [0.00] 
 
Note:  Franklin (which lies partly in Waikato region) is co-integrated at the 10% level (excluding trend) with Hauraki, Waikato, Waipa, Otorohanga.  It is co-
integrated at the 20% level (allowing for deterministic trend) with all Waikato TLAs other than Hamilton. 
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Table 9: Unit Root Tests - Bay of Plenty Region (RC04)  
 
          Western BoP  Tauranga  Rotorua Whakatane  Kawerau Opotiki
Western BoP  -  0.00        0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Tauranga        0.22 - 0.24 0.02  0.37  0.00 
Rotorua            0.67 0.22 - 0.00  0.78 0.00
Whakatane  0.00          0.01 0.69 - 0.88 0.00 
Kawerau           0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 - 0.02 
Opotiki  0.00            0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 -
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
WBOP – TAUR   0.0017  [0.00]        WBOP – ROTO    0.0030  [0.00] 
WBOP – WHAK   0.0011  [0.02]        WBOP – KAWE   0.0080  [0.00] 
WBOP – OPOT   0.0023  [0.00]        TAUR – WHAK  -0.0005  [0.14] 
TAUR – OPOT   0.0007  [0.15]        ROTO – WHAK  -0.0013  [0.00] 
WHAK – OPOT   0.0018  [0.00]        KAWE – OPOT  -0.0035  [0.00] 
 
Table 10: Unit Root Tests - Hawke's Bay Region (RC06)  
 
  Wairoa  Hastings  Napier  Central Hawke's Bay 
Wairoa        - 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hastings  0.15  -  0.00  0.00 
Napier  0.17  0.00  -  0.00 
Central Hawke's Bay  0.02  0.25      0.27 -
 
Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]           Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
WROA  –  HAST  -0.0041 [0.00]      WROA  –  NAPI  -0.0039 [0.00] 
WROA – CHAW  -0.0026  [0.00]          HAST – CHAW   0.0022  [0.00] 
NAPI – CHAW   0.0024  [0.00] 
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Table 11: Unit Root Tests - Taranaki Region (RC07) 
 
  New Plymouth  Stratford  South Taranaki 
New Plymouth  -  0.00  0.00 
Stratford  0.00      - 0.00
South Taranaki  0.00      0.00 -
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
NEWP – STRA   0.0013  [0.01]        STRA - STAR   -0.0026  [0.00] 
 
Table 12: Unit Root Tests - Manawatu-Wanganui Region (RC08)  
 
        Ruapehu  Wanganui  Rangatikei  Manawatu  Palm. North  Tararua Horowhenua
Ruapehu    -  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Wanganui  0.06  -  0.02          0.00 0.00 0.30 0.67
Rangatikei  0.00  0.14  -  0.00      0.00 0.00 0.24 
Manawatu          0.31 0.11  0.22  -  0.00 0.26 0.09
Palm. North  0.23  0.32  0.31  0.00  -      0.33 0.22
Tararua  0.19            0.15 0.00  0.20 0.36 - 0.22
Horowhenua            0.36 0.34 0.34 0.04 0.10 0.15  - 
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
RUAP – WANG  -0.0033  [0.00]        RUAP – RANG  -0.0009  [0.14] 
RUAP – MANA  -0.0036  [0.00]        RUAP – PALM  -0.0026  [0.00] 
RUAP – TARA  -0.0018  [0.00]        RUAP – HORO  -0.0029  [0.00] 
WANG – RANG   0.0019  [0.01]        WANG – MANA  -0.0012  [0.00] 
WANG – PALM  -0.0006  [0.02]        RANG – MANA  -0.0034  [0.00] 
RANG – PALM  -0.0027  [0.00]        RANG – TARA  -0.0010  [0.06] 
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Table 13: Unit Root Tests - Wellington Region (RC09)  
 
  Kapiti  Porirua  Wellington  Lower Hutt  Upper Hutt  Masterton  Carterton  S.Wairarapa 
Kapiti    -  0.10 0.44  0.00 0.00 0.18  0.00  0.00 
Porirua  0.03  -              0.24 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Wellington          0.38 0.16  -  0.17  0.01 0.06 0.00 0.03 
Lower Hutt  0.13  0.00  0.60        - 0.00 0.01 0.10  0.00 
Upper  Hutt  0.51            0.34 0.65 0.16  - 0.02 0.10 0.00 
Masterton  0.20              0.22 0.24 0.03 0.00 -  0.00 0.04
Carterton  0.20  0.00  0.28  0.02          0.03 0.00 - 0.00
S.Wairarapa  0.03            0.00 0.00 0.35 0.50 0.41 0.10  - 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
KAPI  -  HUTT     0.0010 [0.00]     KAPI  -  UHUT     0.0024 [0.00] 
KAPI  -  MAST     0.0012 [0.05]     KAPI  -  CART     0.0020 [0.00] 
KAPI  -  SWRP   -0.0007 [0.10]     PORI  -  HUTT     0.0006 [0.04] 
PORI – UHUT   0.0020  [0.00]        PORI - MAST    0.0016  [0.01] 
PORI  -  CART     0.0020 [0.00]     PORI  -  SWRP   -0.0010 [0.02] 
WELL – HUTT   0.0008  [0.01]        WELL – UHUT   0.0016  [0.00] 
WELL – MAST   0.0012  [0.02]        WELL – CART   0.0020  [0.00] 
HUTT – UHUT   0.0015  [0.00]        HUTT – MAST   0.0009  [0.03] 
HUTT – SWRP  -0.0016  [0.00]        UHUT – SWRP  -0.0033  [0.00] 
MAST – CART  -0.0015  [0.00]        MAST – SWRP  -0.0022  [0.00] 
CART – SWRP  -0.0029  [0.00] 
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Table 14: Unit Root Tests - Nelson-MT Region (RC11)  
 
        Tasman Nelson Marlborough
Tasman        - 0.00 0.00
Nelson  0.06  -  0.00 
Marlborough  0.00    0.00 - 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
TASM – NELS   0.0016  [0.00]        TASM – MARL    0.0010  [0.00] 
NELS – MARL  -0.0003  [0.18] 
 
Table 15: Unit Root Tests - West Coast Region (RC12)  
 
        Buller Grey Westland
Buller    - 0.00  0.00 
Grey  0.01  -  0.00 
Westland  0.00    0.00 - 
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]    Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
BULL – GREY  -0.0025  [0.00]        BULL – WEST  -0.0009  [0.12] 
GREY – WEST   0.0023  [0.00]   
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Table 16: Unit Root Tests - Canterbury Region (RC13) 
 
        Kaikoura  Hurunui  Waimakariri Christchurch Banks.
Pen 
  Selwyn Ashburton Timaru Mackenzie Waimate
Kaikoura                - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03  0.00 
Hurunui  0.00  -  0.00        0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.03  0.00 
Waimakariri  0.00          0.00 -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25  0.00  0.11  0.00 
Christchurch  0.00                0.00 0.00 -  0.00 0.00 0.57 0.72 0.13 0.00 
Banks. Pen  0.00              0.00 0.02 0.00 -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09  0.00 
Selwyn  0.00              0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -  0.00 0.00 0.19  0.00 
Ashburton  0.13             0.13 0.44 0.76 0.30 0.81 - 0.00  0.08  0.00 
Timaru 0.35                  0.39 0.64 0.67 0.20 0.66 0.24 -  0.18 0.00
Mackenzie  0.02                   0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09 - 0.05
Waimate  0.01  0.27  0.03            0.06 0.02 0.13  0.00 0.00 0.02 - 
 
Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]      Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
KAIK  –  WMAK    0.0015 [0.01]       KAIK  -  CHRI     0.0012 [0.02] 
KAIK  –  SELW    0.0012 [0.04]       KAIK  –  ASHB   0.0043 [0.00] 
KAIK  -  TIMA     0.0052 [0.00]       KAIK  –  MACK    0.0012 [0.15] 
KAIK  –  WMAT    0.0043 [0.00]       HURU  –  WMAK    0.0011 [0.02] 
HURU  –  CHRI    0.0008 [0.07]       HURU  –  SELW    0.0006 [0.15] 
HURU  –  ASHB    0.0037 [0.00]       HURU  –  TIMA    0.0052 [0.00] 
HURU  –  MACK    0.0008 [0.20]       HURU  –  WMAT    0.0048 [0.00] 
WMAK  –  CHRI  -0.0005 [0.00]       WMAK  –BANK  -0.0023 [0.00] 
WMAK  –  SELW  -0.0005 [0.09]       WMAK  –  TIMA    0.0037 [0.00] 
WMAK  -  WMAT    0.0032 [0.00]       CHRI  –  BANK  -0.0019 [0.00] 
CHRI  –  WMAT    0.0030 [0.00]       BANK  –  SELW    0.0014 [0.01] 
BANK  –  ASHB    0.0047 [0.00]       BANK  –  TIMA    0.0065 [0.00] 
BANK  –  WMAT    0.0054 [0.00]       SELW  –  ASHB    0.0034 [0.00] 
SELW  –  TIMA    0.0045 [0.00]       SELW  –  WMAT    0.0034 [0.00] 
ASHB  –  TIMA    0.0020 [0.00]       ASHB  –  WMAT    0.0011 [0.06] 
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Table 17: Unit Root Tests - Otago Region (14RC) 
 
          Waitaki Queenstown  Central Otago  Dunedin Clutha
Waitaki -  0.87  0.32  0.00  0.00 
Queenstown          0.84 - 0.14  0.87 0.38
Central Otago  0.13  0.26        - 0.94 0.00
Dunedin  0.18  0.68      0.42 - 0.00 
Clutha  0.00  0.45  0.00    0.00 - 
 
Significant Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:]     Significant  Trend  Coefficient  [p-value:] 
WTKI – DUNE  -0.0040  [0.00]        QUEE – COTA   0.0015  [0.03] 





Table 18: Unit Root Tests - Southland Region (RC15) 
        Southland Gore Invercargill
Southland    - 0.00  0.28 
Gore        0.87 - 0.25
Invercargill        0.90 0.12 -
 
Significant Trend    Coefficient  [p-value:] 
SOUT – GORE     0.0079  [0.00] 
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Table 19:  Percentage of Sub-Areas Co-integrated (with unit coefficient) 
 
  Combinations  No Deterministic Trend; @ 10%  With or Without Deterministic Trend; @ 20%
RCs    91  19 52 
Northland        3 67 100
Auckland        21 48 90
Waikato        45 53 96
Bay of Plenty  15  40  73 
Gisborne        - n.a. n.a.
Hawkes Bay  6  33  100 
Taranaki        3 100 100
Manawatu-Wanganui        21 29 81
Wellington        28 43 96
Nelson MT  3  100  100 
West Coast  3  100  100 
Canterbury        45 67 93
Otago        10 30 60
Southland        3 0 67
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Table 20:   Coefficient [& p-Value] of ∆ln (real house price) on 4 lags of itself and constant (results presented only for 
coefficients with p<0.100) 
 
Lag:                              RC01 RC02 RC03 RC04 RC05 RC06 RC07 RC08 RC09 RC11 RC12 RC13 RC14 RC15








    -0.36  -0.32 
[0.00]  [0.00] 
 -0.19  -0.35 
[0.09]  [0.00] 
(-2)               -0.32 
[0.01] 
-0.19  -0.38 




(-3)                  -0.31 
[0.01] 
 










   
R
2 0.21                        0.06 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.12
LM                              0.73 0.28 0.18 0.41 0.03* 0.08 0.33 0.18 0.88 0.16 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.38
LM lists the p-value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation 
Despite the significant LM statistic, the DW statistic for this regression is 1.998 
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Table 21:   Correlation Coefficients of Quarterly Changes in log of Real Sales Price:  14 Regional Councils (1981:2 - 
2002:4) 
 
                              RC01 RC02 RC03 RC04 RC05 RC06 RC07 RC08 RC09 RC11 RC12 RC13 RC14 RC15
R C 0 1                 
RC02  0.20      
RC03          0.00 0.14
RC04  0.28    0.34 0.14   
RC05  0.16  0.34  0.16  0.19  
RC06        0.11 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.26  
RC07  0.15  0.30  0.16  0.34 0.12 0.07  
RC08        0.14 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.39 0.27  
RC09  0.19    0.52 0.13  0.43 0.16 0.28 0.29 0.24  
RC11    0.13 0.27  -0.07  0.30 0.05 0.38 0.22 0.27 0.25 
RC12        0.05 0.06  0.27 0.27 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.09
RC13  0.29      0.37 0.17  0.39 0.38 0.34 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.14
RC14    -0.02 0.23  0.17  0.25 0.14 0.36 0.09 0.18 0.14  0.25 0.19 0.31
RC15  0.21        0.23 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.22 0.24
Figures in bold are significantly different from 0 at 5% significance level (1-tailed test) 
Figures in italics are significantly different from 0 at 10% significance level (1-tailed test) 
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Table 22:  % of Significant Correlations: TLAs within RCs 
 
Region  Significant at 5%  Significant at 10% 
RC01      0 33
RC02      67 81
RC03      18 33
RC04      20 20
RC05      na Na
RC06      0 17
RC07      0 0
RC08      5 19
RC09      32 43
RC11      0 0
RC12      67 67
RC13      9 13
RC14      10 20




Table 23:   Granger Causality Tests: Regional Councils X (vertical axis) Granger-Causes Y (horizontal axis); p-level 
indicated where p<0.100 (bold ⇒ bi-directional causality)* 
 
2  lags                              RC01 RC02 RC03 RC04 RC05 RC06 RC07 RC08 RC09 RC11 RC12 RC13 RC14 RC15
RCO1     0.04            0.04 
RC02  0.01               0.04   
RC03  0.02                  0.09  0.01 
RC04  0.01               0.08  0.09   0.08 
RC05  0.10               0.09    0.03    0.06 
RC06  0.00              0.00  0.00    0.00  0.01   
RC07  0.09              0.00  0.02    0.02   
RC08                0.09      0.03 
RC09  0.00               0.06    0.03   
RC11             0.01 0.09    0.00    0.00  0.04   
RC12   0.06                  
RC13                       0.01   0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
RC14                0.02    0.02       
RC15  0.05                  0.00  0.01  0.07 
 
4 lags  RC01  RC02                          RC03 RC04 RC05 RC06 RC07 RC08 RC09 RC11 RC12 RC13 RC14 RC15
RCO1                 0.02  0.09 
RC02  0.01                0.01  0.09    0.06 
R C 0               3          
RC04  0.01                0.02 
R C 0               5       0.07  0.06 
RC06  0.00                   0.00  0.00  0.02 0.08 0.00 0.05  
RC07         0.01  0.04     0.03   0.09   
RC08  0.07             0.07      0.03  0.06  0.01
RC09   0.02             0.03     
RC11               0.01    0.00  0.02  0.02 
RC12               0.09       
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RC13  0.01               0.01  0.03  0.01  0.05 
RC14             0.01  0.07   0.06   0.09   
RC15                0.06  0.00   0.00   
*Formally, a significant p denotes rejection of the hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y. 
Table 24: Granger-Causality Impact of RC on Other RCs 
  Region "Causes" Others  Region is "Caused by" Others 
      2-lags    4-lags Average 2-lags    4-lags Average
RC01  2  2          2 10 5 7.5
RC02              2 4 3 1 2 1.5
RC03             3 0 1.5 7 5 6
RC04              4 2 3 0 0 0
RC05              4 2 3 5 3 4
RC06              5 7 6 1 2 1.5
RC07              4 4 4 7 5 6
RC08             2 5 3.5 3 5 4
RC09              3 2 2.5 0 3 1.5
RC11             5 4 4.5 6 6 6
RC12              1 1 1 1 2 1.5
RC13              7 5 6 3 2 2.5
RC14              2 4 3 3 5 4
RC15              4 3 3.5 1 0 0.5
Average              3.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.2
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Table 25:   Estimates of (6.2) OLS Results (constant included but not reported; "t-statistics" in brackets; ***,**,* signif. at 
1%,5%,10%) 
LPZZ                LNBZZ UCZZ UCD LASZZ TIME TIME
2 R
2 s.e. ADF

















































































































































































































































+The second figures in each case in the R
2 and s.e. columns present the R
2 and s.e. for the equations estimated as a panel with coefficients on LNBZZ, UCZZ & 
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